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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the effect of well-being indictors and social
globalization on the migration of Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) from Central
America. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the surge in UAC that began
in 2014 at the United States southern border is driven primarily by violence, or whether
other factors are at play. Using data for the period 2008-2018, the apprehension of UAC
serves as a proxy for measuring unaccompanied child migration to the United States.
The four countries of focus are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico as they
contribute the largest numbers of child migrants by country of origin. Well-being
indicators will extend beyond the traditional definitions of economic prosperity, to
include measures on the overall well-being of youth, as supported by the literature.
Unemployment rates of young adults and expected years of schooling are included as a
measure of youth engagement in productive activities, while homicide rates measure the
threat to leading a productive, healthy life. Global social network links are considered as
possible pull factors of migration and measured through a social globalization index.
First, a parametric fixed effects regression model is used to show the relationship
between the various push-pull factors and UAC migration. The engagement of youth in
school or work, along with increased social globalization, prove to be significant in
explaining heightened UAC migration. Second, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis and
Mann-Whitney U tests reveal that the populations of the four source countries are not
statistically similar and should not be treated as one. Finally, change point detection ties
changes in UAC migratory patterns to the historical events of the time period.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the
support and encouragement I received from the faculty and staff of the International
Development Doctoral Program. I would like to thank Dr. Joseph St. Marie for his
support from day one of the program, as well as Mrs. Annette Copeland for her
unwavering positive spirit. Thank you to Dr. Robert Pauly and Dr. Edward Sayre for
serving on my dissertation committee and providing guidance on my work.
My most sincere gratitude goes out to my mentor and major professor, Dr. Iliyan
Iliev. I was fortunate to be his student in my first semester of the IDV program, which
laid the groundwork for this research. It was his rigorous academic standards and
unwavering support of my work that made this dissertation possible. I have him to thank
for sparking my interest in quantitative research, and for helping me to see the invaluable
contributions I can make.
.

iii

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my loved ones who have been instrumental in
helping me to reach this monumental goal. In particular,
To my parents: Dr. Guillermo Dárdano and Mrs. Carmen Elisabeth Schimmel de
Dárdano. Although they are no longer with me, their belief in the importance of a good
education still lives in every one of my achievements.
To my husband, Scott: You have seen me through my relentless pursuit of higher
education, and I am eternally grateful to you for supporting my dreams. Thank you for
your patience during all those times when I said I was done and never really was. I can
now safely say, I am officially done! None of this would be worth it without you.
To my children, JP and Kayla: I am honored to be your mom, and I thank you
from the bottom of my heart for always telling me how proud you are of me. You will
always be my greatest accomplishment.
To my dearest friend and spiritual guide, Maureen Doherty: your love and support
of me has no bounds. You have shown me what it means to be an educator, and the
impact we can make in just “our little corner” of the world. Thank you for always loving
me just the way I am, while encouraging me to be my best.
To my mentor and friend, Dr. Barbara Caldwell: Words cannot express my
gratitude for all you’ve done for me. You have been a guiding light in this entire process,
seeing the potential in me even when I had not yet seen it in myself. You always pushed
me to the next level, even when I was ready to just settle. You are an inspiration to me
professionally and personally, never sacrificing your values while working tirelessly to
make a difference in the lives of others.
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................. ix
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER II – BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 7
Previous waves of migration from the Northern Triangle countries .............................. 8
Migration from El Salvador ........................................................................................ 9
Migration from Guatemala ....................................................................................... 12
Migration from Honduras ......................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER III - LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................... 20
Youth at risk .................................................................................................................. 21
Economic conditions ................................................................................................. 25
Educational opportunities ......................................................................................... 27
Family Reunification .................................................................................................... 28
United States immigration policy ............................................................................. 30
Social globalization ................................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER IV – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .......................................................... 36
v

A novel dataset .............................................................................................................. 36
Human Development Index to measure push factors ................................................... 44
KOF Globalization Index to measure pull factors ........................................................ 46
Descriptive statistics ..................................................................................................... 49
Fixed effects model ....................................................................................................... 53
Tests of the estimated regression model ................................................................... 55
Normality of the error term. .................................................................................. 56
Homoscedasticity of the error term....................................................................... 56
Multicollinearity. .................................................................................................. 57
Cross-sectional dependence. ................................................................................. 57
Mean of error term. ............................................................................................... 58
Autocorrelation. .................................................................................................... 58
Tests of population distributions................................................................................... 58
Kruskal-Wallis/ Mann-Whitney U test on Human Development Index ................... 59
Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U test on KOF Social Globalization Index ............ 60
Change point detection ................................................................................................. 61
CHAPTER V RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................... 62
Fixed effects model ....................................................................................................... 62
Tests of the estimated regression model ................................................................... 68
Skewness and Kurtosis (SK) test for panel data models....................................... 68
vi

The Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity. ................................. 69
Correlation matrix. ................................................................................................ 69
Variance Inflation Factor. ..................................................................................... 71
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence. ............................................................ 72
Mean of error term. ............................................................................................... 72
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. ..................................................................... 73
Tests of population distributions................................................................................... 74
Kruskal-Wallis/ Mann-Whitney U test on Human Development Index ................... 74
Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U test on KOF Social Globalization Index ............ 77
Change point detection ................................................................................................. 81
Change point detection, El Salvador ......................................................................... 82
Change point detection, Guatemala .......................................................................... 84
Change point detection, Honduras ............................................................................ 86
Change point detection, Mexico ............................................................................... 88
CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 92
Future research .............................................................................................................. 95
APPENDIX A– Additional Tables ................................................................................... 98
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 101

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 UAC apprehensions and homicide rates by country ............................................ 44
Table 2 Components of the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index ............................ 48
Table 3 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................ 50
Table 4 Fixed effects regression results ............................................................................ 63
Table 5 SK test results for panel data models ................................................................... 69
Table 6 Modified Wald test results ................................................................................... 69
Table 7 Correlation Coefficients with p-values in italics ................................................. 71
Table 8 VIF organized in descending order ...................................................................... 72
Table 9 Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence ............................................................ 72
Table 10 Statistics on the error term ................................................................................. 73
Table 11 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data ............................................. 73
Table 12 Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U tests for the HDI .......................................... 75
Table 13 Mann-Whitney U tests on HDI: Guatemala & Honduras .................................. 77
Table 14 Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U tests on Social Globalization ....................... 78
Table 15 Mann-Whitney U tests on Social Globalization: Guatemala & Honduras ........ 80
Table A1. Dataset variables and their respective sources ................................................. 98
Table A2. KOF Social Globalization de facto index, breakdown of components ............ 99
Table A3. Fixed effects model results with clustered standard errors ............................ 100

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1. Foreign-born population from the Northern Triangle countries........................ 19
Figure 2. Foreign-born population including Mexico....................................................... 19
Figure 3. Components of the Human Development Index ............................................... 45
Figure 4. UAC Apprehensions.......................................................................................... 51
Figure 5. Youth unemployment rates................................................................................ 51
Figure 6. Expected years of schooling .............................................................................. 52
Figure 7. Homicide rates ................................................................................................... 52
Figure 8. KOF Social Globalization de facto Index ......................................................... 53
Figure 9. Mean and variance changepoints for El Salvador ............................................. 83
Figure 10. Mean and variance changepoints for Guatemala............................................. 85
Figure 11. Mean and variance changepoints for Honduras .............................................. 87
Figure 12. Mean and variance changepoints for Mexico .................................................. 89

ix

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
Unaccompanied Alien Children (UAC) apprehensions at the United States
southern border have been steadily increasing since fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2014,
the surge shifted from being predominantly Mexican children to children from three
Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These three Central
American countries are commonly referred to as the “Northern Triangle” countries. In
fiscal year 2009, Mexican UAC accounted for nearly eighty-two percent of all UAC
apprehensions, with apprehensions from the Northern Triangle countries adding another
seventeen percent. By fiscal year 2019 the proportions had reversed, and Northern
Triangle UAC apprehensions accounted for eighty-five percent of total UAC
apprehensions. The majority were young adult males. Females accounted for only
thirty-one percent of the total, and only twenty-three percent of UAC apprehensions were
children under the age of fifteen (Kandel 2019).
Unaccompanied children become an easy target for human trafficking, sexual
violence, and extortion while en route to the United States; and while this should be case
enough to warrant further investigation, the financial implications on the United States
economy are also significant. From a United States policy standpoint, the UAC surge
poses a strain on the budgets of federal agencies, as well as on efforts to curb criminal
behavior and gang violence within the United States. The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) is responsible for the apprehension, processing, and detention of UACs,
while the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), through the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR), is responsible for their care until the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) conducts immigration proceedings. In 2018 alone, United
1

States federal government spending on the UAC program totaled $1.6 billion (Kandel
2019). Therefore, there is both a moral and financial urgency to understanding the
motivating forces behind UAC migration.
Much of the unaccompanied child migration research to date has been qualitative
in nature conducted through non-governmental organizations. Published research
findings have been mostly rooted in surveys and interviews conducted with child
migrants, with many reporting violence as a motivation to leave their home countries
(Chishti et al. 2015, Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014, Swanson et al. 2016, Lorenzen
2017). Rising homicide rates have been cited repeatedly in the literature as driving forces
behind child migration from this region (Kennedy 2014, Wong 2014, Swanson et al.
2016, Lorenzen 2017). Since the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico have suffered
heightened homicide rates in the past decade, child migration is seen as homogeneous if
originating in this region. This approach is flawed. For example, Wong (2014) attempts
to illustrate the connection between homicide rates on UAC apprehensions by showing a
positive correlation between the two variables. However, when separating out child
migration and homicides by country of origin, UAC apprehensions by country do not
move in line with homicide rates by country. Thus, while the relationship may hold at an
aggregate level for the Northern Triangle region, the country-level effects are less clear.
In addition, economic and social conditions do differ across countries, and this may be
overlooked when child migration is seen from an aggregate-level perspective alone. As
to the factors that may draw unaccompanied children to the United States, family
reunification is often mentioned (Nazario 2014, Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014).
Lorenzen (2017), however, finds that family reunification is often mentioned in
2

conjunction with another motivating factor, such as a lack of jobs, more so than as the
exclusive factor.
Overall elevated migration numbers from the Northern Triangle countries began
as far back as the late 1970s and 1980s, and the migratory patterns were not identical
across all three countries. Therefore, the question as to why a surge in unaccompanied
migrant children from this region began in 2012, decades later, remains unanswered.
One possible explanation has been U.S. immigration policy. Wong (2014), however,
finds no link to the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program,
asserting that the growth in UAC apprehensions from the Northern Triangle countries
began long before the passage of DACA. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2016) explores the
impact of DACA further, conducting one of the first quantitative studies of UAC
migration that did not rely on qualitative survey responses from child migrants. The
authors find stronger statistical significance for the 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) than for DACA. The limited time
period of these studies, however, prohibits more robust analysis. Ameudo-Dorantes et al.
(2016) end with fiscal year 2013 data, while Wong (2014) only analyzes data through
2014. Furthermore, the CBP only began collecting UAC apprehension data beginning in
October 2006. Nonetheless, even if family reunification through more favorable U.S.
immigration policies is a motivating factor in child migration, the circumstances that
would facilitate such reunification are left largely unexplored. Social globalization,
through increased telecommunications and secondary income flows, is not addressed by
the literature as a factor in UAC migration from the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
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This research broadens the investigation of the push and pull factors of UAC
migration to also include the growing interconnectedness of geographically displaced
communities. A comprehensive set of factors influencing UAC migration, both at an
aggregate level as well at the individual country-level are considered. The security and
economic conditions within each country are considered as possible “push” factors to
increased migration, while potential “pull” factors are drawn from a greater
interconnectedness between these countries and the United States. This growing
interconnectedness provides not only a common understanding of the social conditions in
both countries, but a financial means to migrate through the transfer of secondary
income, or remittances. Donato et al. (2015) highlight the importance of migration
networks and the influence of a parent’s migratory patterns on a child’s decision to
migrate. However, again the authors only review qualitative survey data through 2013,
while the surge of Northern Triangle children began in 2014. Therefore, while previous
studies have looked to identify the push and pull factors of unaccompanied child
migration from the Northern Triangle and Mexico, no quantitative study has yet to
include data that encompasses the years of the surge and beyond. This research will
cover UAC migration for the time period 2008 to 2018, which allows for more relevant
conclusions to be made regarding the factors motivating the rise in Northern Triangle
child migrants in particular. Furthermore, it will look specifically into the growing
interconnectedness of source and destination countries, using a social globalization index
that incorporates increased communication, trade, and financial flows, while still
considering the local conditions of each country.
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The following research question is presented: Do unstable conditions in the
Northern Triangle countries of Central America and Mexico, along with increased social
and economic network links to the United States, heighten unaccompanied child
migration?
First, an innovative and novel dataset is presented. Quantitative data from the
World Bank and United Nations is synthesized with other non-governmental organization
data to obtain a more comprehensive and reliable dataset. Homicide data is gathered
from Instituto Igarape, a Brazilian think tank. Instituto Igarape partners with leading
private sector companies, such as Microsoft, Google and McKinsey, as well as
international non-governmental organizations, such as the Red Cross and the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to conduct
development research throughout Latin America and obtain statistics directly from local
governments and universities (Instituto Igarape 2019). This public-private partnership
allows Igarape to produce statistics that are not only more reliable than a one-source
dataset, but also allows for access to the latest, most updated data. Furthermore, data
from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, a private economic research institute that
focuses on global economic development, is also incorporated into this new dataset.
KOF globalization data is synthesized from public and private organizations, such as the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), UNESCO, as well as global corporations
such as McDonald’s and IKEA (KOF 2019). It is used by various governments
worldwide and has a significant presence in the literature (Potrafke 2015). In order to
more precisely measure the role of social networks in child migration, the KOF

5

Globalization Index is further deconstructed to single out only factors reflecting social
globalization.
In summary, this research looks at the push and pull factors affecting child
migration from each of the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico at both an aggregate
and a country-specific level. The research methods employed encompass both parametric
and nonparametric quantitative analysis in order to achieve more robust conclusions.
With parametric analysis, a fixed effects model on UAC migration is presented to
account for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries, while still allowing for
generalized conclusions regarding the factors of migration. Nonparametric statistics will
be used to confirm that these four countries are statistically different from one another, in
both their local conditions as well as their ties to the greater global community. Finally,
change point detection is employed to further pinpoint specific time periods where mean
UAC migration, as well as the variability in UAC migration, experienced significant
deviations from previous levels.

6

CHAPTER II – BACKGROUND
A brief background is presented on recent trends in UAC migration, followed by a
historical overview of migration from the Northern Triangle countries. Much of the
literature points to migration as a self-reinforcing behavior. Understanding the conditions
faced by people in the Northern Triangle countries, their migration trends and continued
ties to the United States provides the context for this study. The background presented is
largely focused on the three Northern Triangle countries rather than on Mexico. The
spike in UAC apprehensions from the Northern Triangle region has been unprecedented,
while the relative percentage of Mexican UAC apprehensions has been declining (Kandel
2019).
Unaccompanied alien children are defined as children under the age of eighteen,
entering the United States illegally, without a parent or legal guardian either
accompanying them or able to provide custody upon their arrival (GAO 2015, Kandel
2019). According to the CBP, approximately ninety-one percent of all apprehensions at
the southern border in May of 2019 originated from the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
Seventy-eight percent were from the Northern Triangle countries alone. In fact, the
number of refugees coming from Central America has reached a level not seen since the
civil wars of the 1980s (Kurtenbach 2016). Heightened violence in the region, tied to the
growing proliferation of gangs, is considered the driving force behind the large numbers
of migrants, particularly children, arriving at the United States southern border (Wong,
2014).
The three Northern Triangle countries have seen their share of violence and
political instability in the past. Poor economic conditions, poverty, and high levels of
7

income inequality are nothing new. The civil wars of Guatemala and El Salvador were
estimated to have killed 275,000 persons (Center for Justice & Accountability 2020a,
2020b). Honduras, which did not experience a civil war itself, was flooded with migrants
seeking refuge across its borders. Violence, in other words, has been a part of the
cultural fabric of this region for decades. Therefore, the 2014 surge in unaccompanied
child migration cannot be solely explained by increased violence and poor socioeconomic conditions in the source countries. Previous migration patterns must also be
considered, along with the networks that these flows create. Accelerated global
interconnectedness that began in force in the 1990s, particularly through the
dissemination of information on the internet, meant that international migrants became
more connected with those remaining behind. Hopper (2007) proposes that cultures are
often entangled with other cultures, and people can simultaneously inhabit different
cultures. The contemporary phase of globalization has been marked by an intensification
of this interconnectedness, which has transformed the social and cultural experience.
And while globalizing processes do not define culture, they certainly shape it. Pieterse
(2000) argues that globalization involves a trend towards human integration, and that
diasporas and migration are a part of this trend. More pointedly, for the purposes of this
research, globalization has played a significant role in reinforcing a culture of migration
in the Northern Triangle countries.
Previous waves of migration from the Northern Triangle countries
Immigration from the Northern Triangle countries to the United States began
decades before the UAC surge of 2014. Civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua during the 1980s drove significant numbers of migrants northward to the
8

relative safety of the United States. Although the subsequent peace accords of the 1990s
brought an end to formal conflict, economic and social insecurity remained.
Furthermore, several natural disasters, including Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and
Nicaragua in 1998 and an earthquake in El Salvador in 2001, led the United States to
designate individuals from these countries for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). While
migration to the United States from Central America has historically been high, the
Northern Triangle countries have contributed the most numbers given their greater
challenges with corruption, gang activity, extortion, and murder (O’Connor et al. 2019).
Migration from El Salvador
As of 2018 there are over 1.4 million Salvadorans living in the United States, and
the U.S.-based Salvadoran diaspora provides a significant amount of secondary income
via remittances to those remaining in El Salvador (MPI 2015, MPI 2020, Menjivar et al.
2018). By the mid-1970s, social tensions in El Salvador erupted into open conflict due to
growing social inequalities and insufficient labor opportunities. Unauthorized migration
to the United States became more common beginning in 1979 after U.S. intervention in
the Nicaraguan civil war and its growing support of right-wing regimes throughout
Central America. As the Salvadoran civil war grew in intensity throughout the 1980s, the
number of unauthorized migrants escaping the war also grew significantly. Few legal
means of migration to the United States were available to Salvadorans during the civil
war given the numerical visa limits granted to any one country (Flores-Yeffal et al.
2018). Furthermore, the United States failed to recognize Salvadorans as political
refugees, even though their claims of political persecution should have qualified them as
asylum seekers. An estimated 75,000 people were killed during the Salvadoran civil war,
9

in addition to the thousands who were tortured or disappeared (Center for Justice &
Accountability 2020a). However, only two percent of the asylum applications filed by
Salvadorans were being approved during this period (Flores-Yeffal et al. 2018, Mejivar et
al. 2018). Nonetheless, illegal immigration from El Salvador continued unencumbered
until the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which
imposed sanctions on employers willing to hire undocumented individuals. Prior to the
passage of IRCA, Salvadorans were more interested in avoiding deportation than
legalizing their stay, and as a consequence, few Salvadorans applied for asylum unless
they were first apprehended. Furthermore, given U.S. military and financial support for
the Salvadoran government during the armed conflict, the United States adopted a public
relations stance that the human rights situation in El Salvador was actually improving
(Coutin 1998, Menjivar et al. 2018). This claim would support the notion that the
majority of Salvadorans in the United States were not in need of asylum. In 1989,
however, it became known that the Salvadoran government was involved in the
assassination of six Jesuit priests, which drew the international attention of human rights
groups. A provision was negotiated as part of the 1990 Immigration Act which allowed
Salvadorans to apply for (a renewable) eighteen months of Temporary Protected Status.
However, by 1992 the Salvadoran government had signed a peace treaty with the guerilla
forces, which made it harder to argue that Salvadorans in the United States should be
classified as refugees who faced persecution if deported. Immigration activists, however,
asserted that the United States had a unique responsibility to aid Salvadorans who had
fled the war, given the role the United States government played in financing the war. As
a result, Salvadorans were allowed to register for deferred enforced departure (DED)
10

status until the final expiration date of April 30, 1996 (Coutin 1998). In 1997, section
203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act provided an
opportunity to apply for lawful residence to Salvadorans who entered the United States
prior to September 1990 and had filed for asylum under the American Baptist Churches
v. Thornburgh (ABC) settlement of 1990 (CIS 2008). Almost 200,000 Salvadorans
received green cards under this provision (Menjivar et al. 2018). Sixty-four percent of
Salvadoran immigrants came to the United States before 2000 (MPI 2015).
Overall, the civil war displaced an estimated one million Salvadorans throughout
the world, roughly one-fifth of the population at the time. The greatest numbers
immigrated to the United States (Coutin 1998, Menjivar et al. 2018). Increased
deportations of Salvadorans from the United States in the 1990s, however, exacerbated
organized crime and gang proliferation in El Salvador. The two major gangs in El
Salvador, Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and Barrio 18, originated in Los Angeles and
proliferated in El Salvador with increased deportations of criminals from the United
States. By the 1990s, these Los Angeles-based gangs had grown more powerful and
violent through the escalating drug trade. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Acts (IIRIRA) permitted the deportation of any non-citizen,
including legal residents, convicted of an aggravated felony. The law was also
retroactive, which meant that even if the individual had become a United States citizen
they could be deported for past crimes as a non-citizen. As a result of mass deportations
of criminals and gang members from the United States beginning in 1996, El Salvador’s
gang epidemic was solidified (Kalsi 2018). As the country grew more unsafe, migration
to the United States became a way to escape this lawlessness.
11

Furthermore, in 2001 El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its official currency
as a way to facilitate greater trade and investment with the United States. However, the
dollarization of the Salvadoran economy did not generate the foreign investment, nor the
economic growth rates, it had intended. The greatest impact has been on the poor who
have faced higher costs of living when paying in dollars at the established exchange rate
(Towers et al. 2004). In addition, two earthquakes in 2001 left many Salvadorans in
precarious conditions. Between 1990 and 2017, the Salvadoran population in the United
States more than tripled. Consequently, family reunification remains a significant
motivator for continuous Salvadoran migration to the United States, facilitated by wellestablished migrant networks throughout the country (Menjivar et al. 2018).
Migration from Guatemala
As of 2018 there are more than one million Guatemalan immigrants living in the
United States, significantly below the numbers of Mexicans and Salvadorans, but larger
than the number of Hondurans (MPI 2020). Although the Guatemalan civil war began in
the 1960s, the first large wave of Guatemalan migration to the United States began in the
late 1970s. Migration during the early stages of the war had been predominantly to
nearby Mexico, where many Guatemalans had established labor networks. As statesponsored attacks against ethnic Mayans intensified, along with a devastating earthquake
in 1976, significantly higher numbers of Guatemalans began seeking refuge in the United
States as well. Approximately 14,000 Guatemalans had emigrated to the United States
by 1977 but this number peaked to over 45,000 by 1989 (Jonas 2013). Ethnic Mayans
constituted by far the greatest number of victims during the Guatemalan civil war, and
historically have experienced discrimination and segregation. They experience higher
12

levels of poverty and unequal access to resources and services, such as adequate
education and healthcare (Jonas 2013, Taft-Morales 2019). Nearly 200,000 Guatemalans
crossed into Mexico and the United States in the early 1980s and were officially
registered as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Nonetheless, neither the United States nor Mexico granted these migrants
refugee status (Jamal 2000, Jonas 2013). Throughout the 1980s, ninety-seven percent of
Salvadoran and ninety-eight percent of Guatemalan asylum petitions were denied.
Outrage over U.S. involvement in both these countries civil wars led to the rise of the
“sanctuary movement” of the 1980s. In 1985, a class-action lawsuit was launched by
supporters of these migrants’ plight against the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) and the U.S. Justice Department. The reasoning was that these
individuals had been denied asylum unjustly due to a focus on foreign policy
considerations and not their individual situations. The case, later known as the American
Baptist Church v Thornburgh (ABC), ended in a 1990 settlement. The settlement
required the INS, which was later reorganized as part of the Department of Homeland
Security, to revisit all the cases of Guatemalans and Salvadorans arriving prior to 1990
that had previously been denied asylum. This legislative victory gave Salvadorans and
Guatemalans special concessions in a later law, the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (NACARA).
Guatemalan immigrants became more significant as a percentage of the United
States immigrant population after the conclusion of the civil war in 1996. Migrant
networks had already been established in the United States and Mexico, and the legal
victories of the 1990s only served to fuel greater migrant numbers given the harsh socio13

economic conditions of post-war Guatemala. Guatemala is among the countries with the
highest income inequality and poverty rates across Central America, and these indicators
only worsen for the largely rural, indigenous population (Janzen 2008, Taft-Morales
2019). During the post-war years between 1999-2007, 43.4 percent of the country’s
wealth was held by the top ten percent of the population and only 0.9 percent held by the
bottom ten percent of the population (Janzen 2008). Guatemala has the lowest tax-to
GDP ratios in the region, at 12.6 percent, which the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund attribute as a factor in the weak post-war recovery (Jonas 2013).
Criminal organizations operate widely throughout the country, with ties to the United
States drug trade and links to gangs operating transnationally in the region.
In 2006, the government of Guatemala and the United Nations agreed to establish
the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) to dismantle and prosecute
criminal groups operating in Guatemala. By 2017 however, former President Jimmy
Morales had ordered the expulsion of the United Nations anti-corruption mission after it
was revealed he and many in his inner circle were under investigation (Taft-Morales
2019). Furthermore, environmental disasters that have displaced hundreds have also
been commonplace, with Hurricane Mitch in 1998, Stan in 2005, and Agatha in 2010, as
well as a magnitude 7.4 earthquake in 2012. Despite the Temporary Protected Status
granted to Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans following natural disasters,
Guatemalans received no such relief (Jonas 2013).
The continued political and economic instability, coupled with violence and
natural disasters, added to an accelerating rate of emigration to the United States. From
2007 to 2015, the Guatemalan population in the United States grew at thirty-one percent,
14

only second to immigration from Honduras. Although Guatemalans have established a
large diaspora in the United States, it is not as entrenched and organized as the
Salvadoran diaspora. Family reunification appears to be less of a reason to migrate, and
instead a means to obtain funds to remit back to family members back home (Jonas
2013). In 2016, out of the three Northern Triangle countries, Guatemalans sent the
highest amount of remittances back home at $7.5 billion (Cohen et al. 2017).
Migration from Honduras
As of 2018 there are approximately 646,000 Honduran immigrants living in the
United States, the smallest number of immigrants from the Northern Triangle but the
third largest from Central America (MPI 2020). Relatively few Honduran immigrants
came to the United States in the 1980s, establishing fewer social networks to facilitate the
increased numbers of migrants that would follow in the coming decades (Reichman
2013). Until the 1990s, international Honduran migration was less common than internal
migration (Blanchard et al. 2011). With a relatively low population density, as economic
opportunity developed in different areas of the country, migration patterns followed.
Throughout the 20th century, Honduras became a magnet for multinational corporations,
especially in the fruit industries. In the 1960s, Honduras began developing its coffee
growing regions which attracted rural workers from around the country. The exportoriented industries of cattle and cotton also flourished, and by the 1980s industrial
development in the north of the country was largely focused on production for the United
States market (Reichman 2013). Throughout the 1980s, when its neighbors were
experiencing civil war, the Honduran economy grew at rate of two percent, compared to
only one percent in Guatemala and a decline of 1.6 percent in El Salvador. After the
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signing of their respective peace accords, however, El Salvador and Guatemala
experienced much stronger growth rates of over four percent annually. The Honduran
economy remained at just a 2.7 percent growth rate throughout the 1990s (Cardemil et al.
2000).
Honduras has long suffered from chronic fiscal instability, with public sector
deficits of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2008 and 7.6 percent in 2013. This was driven
primarily by worsening terms of trade, as well as increased public sector spending tied to
inflated salaries and debt repayments. Furthermore, Honduras has been slow to recover
from the global financial crisis of 2009, exacerbating low employment opportunities and
stagnating labor productivity. The Honduran economy is particularly susceptible to U.S.
market fluctuations given its reliance on remittances from Hondurans working abroad.
This vulnerability is most acute in the rural areas, where sixty-five percent of the
households are considered to live in chronic poverty (World Bank Group 2015b).
Although Honduras did not endure a civil war, it was not shielded from the
deleterious effects of large movements of Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and, to a lesser extent,
Guatemalan refugees across its borders. Furthermore, Honduras became the base of U.S.
operations in the Cold War struggle against the spread of communism in Latin America.
At the end of the Cold War, Honduran migratory patterns began to take on a more
international trend. Continued focus on Honduras’ export industry left many rural
workers struggling. When Hurricane Mitch struck in 1998, 1.5 million Hondurans were
estimated to have been displaced, leaving 17,000 workers jobless due to losses in the
agricultural sector (Reichman 2013). Furthermore, in 1999 those Hondurans already
living in the United States became eligible for Temporary Protected Status due to the
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devastation of Hurricane Mitch. In fact, between 1990 and 2000, out of all Central
American countries, Honduran immigration to the United States experienced the fastest
growth. The rise in Honduran migration after the Cold War is largely seen as one of
economic opportunity. In the 1990s, the political system in Honduras failed to bring
economic stability and increased social welfare (Reichman 2013). The deteriorating
conditions came to head when in 2009, the two main political parties with support from
the legislature and the supreme court, participated in a military coup against thenPresident Manuel Zelaya who had become increasingly populist. In the years following
the coup, the rival political party, the Partido Nacional, consolidated power and further
eroded checks and balances in governance. After mass protests, in 2016 an Organization
of American States (OAS)-backed mission to Fight against Corruption and Impunity in
Honduras (MACCIH) was created (Meyer 2020). The mission, together with the
Attorney General’s office, has advanced several investigations regarding corruption by
senior officials. However, in May 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled that although
MACCIH was constitutional, some elements of the anti-corruption prosecutorial unit
were not. This further undermined anti-corruption efforts (HRW 2020).
Despite their overall lower numbers, since the 1980s more Hondurans have been
deported by the United States government than any other Central American country of
origin (Blanchard et al. 2011). Several factors put Honduran immigrants more at risk for
deportation. They tend to be more recently arrived, younger males with fewer immigrant
network connections, and their arrival also coincides with greater U.S. immigration
enforcement efforts. United States border patrol appropriations more than tripled from
1990 to 2010, and the number of border patrol agents quadrupled from 1992 to 2008
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(Blanchard et al. 2011). A number of laws also facilitated greater deportations at the
time, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996 and the 2001 USA
Patriot Act. In fact, from 1900 to 1990, overall annual deportations were relatively stable
at around 20,000 per year. Between 1990 and 1995, given the political climate at the
time, deportations began averaging 40,000 a year. Between 1996 to 2017, after the
passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA, there were more than 270,000 deportations on average
per year (Hagan et al. 2008, DHS 2017). Nonetheless, between 2007 and 2015 the
Honduran foreign-born population in the United States grew the fastest of any country
(Cohen et al. 2017).
The relative size of the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran diasporas in the
United States can be seen in the figures below. The foreign-born population in the
United States from the Northern Triangle countries is shown in Figure 1, and for a better
comparison of the differences in magnitude, the Mexican foreign-born population is
added in Figure 2. A decline in the Mexican foreign-born population is evident around
the time of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, while the populations from the Northern
Triangle continued their rise.
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Figure 1. Foreign-born population from the Northern Triangle countries

Figure 2. Foreign-born population including Mexico
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CHAPTER III - LITERATURE REVIEW
The factors which enter into a person’s decision to migrate fall into four broad
categories: a) factors associated with the area of origin, or “push” factors, b) factors
associated with the area of destination, or “pull” factors, b) intervening obstacles, and c)
personal factors (Lee 1966). Since the decision to migrate entails a heavy cost, migration
from developing countries tends to occur ‘en masse’ and is largely done under states of
duress. For example, economic hardship is considered an important push factor in
migration. Furthermore, the net benefits between migrating to a new area and staying in
the area of origin is influenced by intervening obstacles, which must be surmounted on
the migratory path (Lee 1966). These intervening obstacles include distance and the
threat of harm, as well as any physical barriers, such as border controls. Factors
associated with the area of destination are influenced by the degree of knowledge a
person has in the destination, where technology can play a significant role. With
increased internet access and the use of social media, awareness of opportunities abroad
increases as does the tendency to migrate (Lee 1966, De Haas 2011). Furthermore,
experience is a powerful force in facilitating repeated migration: A person who has
migrated previously is more likely to migrate again (Lee 1966, Donato et al. 2015). The
existence of a migratory patterns of movement create contacts between the origin and the
destination (Lee 1966). These connections reduce the uncertainty in migration, which
can be further reinforced from parents to children (Donato et al. 2015). In this way, a
population can adopt a culture of migration.
Several push and pull factors of migration have been cited in the literature as
motives behind the surge in the migration of children from Central America to the United
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States. In the paragraphs to follow, the push and pull factors of UAC migration will be
presented. First, the push factors are presented, which revolve around the well-being of a
population and can be loosely addressed by the United Nation’s Human Development
Index (HDI). The individual variables contributing to the well-being of youth, however,
are further disseminated to get a more pointed picture of the factors affecting youth
migration. Deteriorating conditions in the Northern Triangle, including the proliferation
of gangs and a steep increase in homicide rates, have led to reduced opportunities for
youth to attend school and achieve gainful employment (Kennedy 2014, Wong 2014,
Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015, Seelke 2016, Swanson et al. 2016, Kandel 2019). The pull
factors of child migration are then explored, which are deeply rooted in family
reunification and economic opportunity. These two factors are intrinsically linked.
Strong ties to family members who have previously migrated to the United States has
created a growing awareness of the possibilities outside the home country (De Haas 2011,
Czaika et al. 2014, Kennedy 2014, Nazario 2014, Donato et al. 2015). Therefore, social
globalization is presented as a pull factor of child migration, given the role it plays not
only in motivating the journey, but in facilitating it through increased
telecommunications and transfers of secondary income.
Youth at risk
According to a 2016 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, “the social
fabric in the northern triangle countries has been stressed by economic factors such as
poverty, inequality, and unemployment, with few opportunities for growing youth
populations.” In 2010, more than twenty-five percent of youth aged 15-24 in El Salvador
and Honduras neither worked nor studied (Seelke 2016). School dropouts, as well as
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unemployed youth, are at particular risk for gang recruitment. This is further supported
in an Organization of American States report that finds that youth are not only more at
risk of violence, but also easily fall prey to the groups that carry out the violence. In El
Salvador for example, more than fifty percent of the homicide victims are young people
between 15 and 29 years old (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015).
The term “NEET” refers to young people who are not engaged in employment,
education, or training. De Hoyos et al. (2016a) conducted a study using official Mexican
government panel data and found that the rate of male youth ages 19 to 24 not studying
or working (i.e. NEETs) was actually not correlated with homicide rates between the
period 1996 and 2006. The authors, however, found a positive correlation between male
NEETs and homicide rates in Mexico between 2007 and 2013, a period where murder
rates tripled. Furthermore, the correlation between NEETs and homicide rates was
strongest in states located along the United States/Mexico border where drug cartels were
prominent. Their findings suggest that the link between NEETs and violence in Mexico
stems from a growing share of male NEETs, a lack of employment opportunities for
youth, and more importantly, an increase in the criminal demand for youth labor. In
Mexico and Central America, where the share of NEETs is above the regional average
and society is rife with gangs and illegal activity, there are heightened risks for youth and
society as a whole (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015). Schmidt (2017), in evaluating
interviews with unaccompanied migrant children for a 2014 United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees study, finds that the three domains of economics, education,
and security were often mentioned together. For Salvadoran children in particular,
economics and security were often mentioned as a concern together, as were education
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and security. For Guatemalan children, the emphasis was more on the relationship
between education and economics. The responses of Mexican and Honduran children
were a combination of all three domains. The connection between economics and
security is tied to the growing gang epidemic. Children report that being out of work
increases your chances of being recruited into a gang, but by working you also increase
your chances of being targeted by a gang for theft or extortion (Schmidt 2017).
De Hoyos et al. (2016b) further studied the NEET phenomenon across fifteen
Latin American countries, including Mexico, El Salvador, and Honduras (data for
Guatemala was unavailable). They harmonized data from Centro de Estudios
Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) and the World Bank, and further
supplemented with household surveys from 1992-2010 which include comparable
variables in school attendance, economic activity, and socio-demographic characteristics.
The authors find that the highest percentages of NEETs in Latin America are in El
Salvador and Honduras. In a further study conducted by the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States (2015), the highest percentage of NEETs were found in
Honduras and Guatemala (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015). In general, both studies find
that the highest numbers of NEETs are found in the Northern Triangle countries of
Central America, where gangs have a greater pool of youth from which to recruit. Gangs
play a significant role in the rising violence, extortion, and forced recruitment of youth in
the Northern Triangle, which has fueled internal displacement, as well as the record
number of UACs fleeing to the United States (Seelke 2016).
Furthermore, the literature emphasizes homicide rates as a strong push factor for
UAC migration (Kennedy 2014, Wong 2014, Swanson et al. 2016, Lorenzen 2017).
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According to a 2015 Joint Report to Congress, the U.S. Department of State, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services concluded that the spike in unaccompanied
minors arriving in the United States is a direct result of increasing organized crime,
illegal armed groups, and high rates of human and drug trafficking and violence in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees 2014 survey of over 400 unaccompanied minors in United States custody,
children revealed that organized criminal violence and domestic violence were the
leading factors behind their migration. The survey found that approximately fifty-eight
percent of the children interviewed were forcibly displaced and faced harm, requiring
international protection. Of these internally displaced children, forty-eight percent shared
experiences of heightened community violence by organized criminal actors. Wong
(2014) further supports these findings by comparing annual percent change in UACs and
absolute homicide rates across the four countries together from 2009 to 2013. The author
finds a strong positive correlation between the two, concluding that the number of
homicides must be a driving force behind UAC migration. A limitation of the research,
however, is that it did not look beyond 2013 data despite the fact that the surge in
migration from the Northern Triangle countries began in 2014. It also did not separate
out UAC apprehensions and homicide rates by individual country of origin. When
correlation between UAC migration by country is compared to a one-year lagged valued
of the homicide rate for 2008 to 2018, the results only prove significant for Guatemala.
More pointedly, the correlation coefficient for UAC and a one-year lag of the homicide
rate is significant when all Northern Triangle countries are taken together, but not when
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they are analyzed individually. Children, when determining whether their safety is in
peril, do not consider the safety of the region, but rather the local conditions.
Furthermore, increased homicide rates can be tied to lower levels of life
expectancy. Canudas-Romo et al. (2019) find that homicide mortality contributes to
changes in life expectancy differently across countries. The life expectancy and causes of
death were analyzed for twenty-three Latin American countries and fifteen European
Union (EU) countries. While all countries have shown increases in life expectancy from
1990 to 2014, several disparities in life expectancy remain. In looking at the contribution
of homicides to the life expectancy gap between Latin American countries and European
countries, the largest disparity seen was for men. In Honduras between 2010 and 2014,
homicide mortality accounted for 1.75 years lower life expectancy for women and 6.3
years lower life expectancy for men compared to EU countries. For Guatemala, which is
also categorized as a low life expectancy country, the male-female gap was less
pronounced, with males losing just over 2 years and females losing less than a year. The
trend of higher life expectancy gaps for males than females due to homicides also held
for El Salvador, classified as a medium-low life expectancy country, and Mexico,
classified as a medium-high life expectancy country. Furthermore, in observing the life
expectancy gap due to homicides for the age group 15-29 years, much higher levels were
recorded for practically all countries (Canudas-Romo et al. 2019).
Economic conditions
In the 2014 study conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, of the 404 migrant children interviewed, issues of deprivation and economic
hardship were a common theme. Furthermore, in the follow-up interviews conducted by
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Schmidt (2017), security and economic concerns were intrinsically linked. A common
response was that gangs were increasing in number because there were not enough jobs,
which made gang membership more attractive. Economic concerns were also seen to be
connected to education, however. With fewer jobs available employers could be more
selective, requiring greater levels of education which is often financially unattainable.
Without the financial ability to obtain higher levels of education and specialization, many
young adults ended up idle, increasing their chances for gang recruitment (Schmidt
2017). Lorenzen (2017) conducted additional surveys of unaccompanied minors across
ten detention centers in Mexico, which housed children mostly from the Northern
Triangle and Mexico repatriated from the United States. The author finds that 57.7
percent of the children cited economic motives behind their migration. Economic
motives were the single largest motive for migration, but many children cited the lack of
educational opportunities as also playing a role in their economic circumstances.
Poor labor force conditions of young adults correlate with a higher percentage of
at-risk youth, i.e. NEETs (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015). According to the United
Nations Economic Analysis and Policy Division in the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (UNDESA), young workers (ages 15-24) face particular challenges in
finding jobs. Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the number of young people
in formal employment has contracted by more than fifteen percent, as compared to the
number of employed adults which has continued to grow. Young people are twice as
likely to be unemployed compared to adults. Youth in Latin America and the Caribbean
are at a greater disadvantage given their lack work experience. One in five youth in the
region is seeking work but remains unemployed (ILO 2018). The dilemma between
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seeking a first job without success and jobs requiring prior work experience is
documented in the mixed-motive migration findings in Lorenzen (2017). Without the
opportunity for formal employment, many young people seek employment in the less
stable informal sector. The share of informal employment for young adults was 62.6
percent in the Latin American and Caribbean region, with rates exceeding eighty percent
in several countries, including Guatemala and Honduras. A lack of decent jobs and
economic opportunities for young people has been a driving force in migration from
Central America (UNDESA 2019).
Educational opportunities
While higher unemployment rates of young adults could be considered an
alarming trend for at-risk youths, if school enrollment rates rise the long-term trend could
be positive (Roser 2019, UNDP 2019). The United Nations Development Programme in
its measurement of the HDI considers not only the GNI per capita of a country to assess
the well-being of a population, but also includes schooling as an indicator of human
capital investment (2019). Lucas (1998) finds that a higher level of education through
schooling or learning by doing correlates with increased productivity and economic
development, which would create even further opportunities for employment and income.
Therefore, even if there were fewer young adults participating in the labor force, if this
was due to greater schooling and investments in human capital, the future prospects of
the country would be better.
Becker (1964), as well as Psacharopoulos et al. (1988), show that economic
earnings tend to be positively correlated with education and skill level. Perotti (1993)
finds that the increased education of individuals raises not only their own productivity but
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also has a positive externality in affecting the productivity of others. Various studies
indicate that additional years of schooling yields additional increases in earnings, but
Psacharopoulos et al. (2004) show that returns for low-income and middle-income
countries is the highest. However, Kalsi (2018) finds that increased U.S. criminal
deportations are linked to gang activity and reduced schooling in El Salvador. Gangs are
found to hinder basic education, primarily for males. In fact, the author finds that for
gang-prone areas, which are those with greater business density and are therefore ripe for
extortion, the weakening economy lowers returns to schooling. Males from these areas
complete less schooling given that more males join gangs (Kalsi 2018). Edwards et al.
(2003) find that males are twenty-seven percent more likely to drop out of school or
never enroll in school at all. This is true in both urban and rural areas. Therefore, if
NEETs are more susceptible to idleness and criminal activity, an increasing percentage of
young males that are neither engaged at school or work face greater incentives to migrate
(Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015, Seelke 2016, Kalsi 2018).
Family Reunification
According to the research of Sonia Nazario (2014), “the increase in divorce and
family disintegration in Latin America has left many single mothers without the means to
feed and raise their children. Single Latin American mothers began migrating in large
numbers, leaving their children with grandparents, other relatives, or neighbors.” Many
unaccompanied minors travel north, risking both physical and emotional harm, in order to
reunite with their parents. Donato et al. (2015) also find that child migration is closely
tied to the previous migratory patterns of their parents. The authors use survey data from
the Mexican and Latin American Migration Projects conducted through 2013. Through
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the use of logistic regressions, they predict a child’s likelihood to migrate based on their
parent’s previous migratory habits. The results indicate that children with migrant
parents are much more likely to embark on a first trip to the United States. A limitation
of the study, however, is that it does not include the years of the surge in child migrations
from the Northern Triangle countries.
Kennedy (2014), in her interviews with 322 migrant children that were returned to
El Salvador, finds that one in three identify family reunification as a primary reason for
leaving home. In addition, over ninety percent of the children had a family member in
the United States, with just over fifty percent having one or both parents in the United
States. Lorenzen (2017) in attempting to separate out the mixed motives of migration
finds that of the 241 children interviewed, 37.8 percent indicated family reunification as a
factor. Only the search for economic opportunities, at 57.7 percent, was a more common
response. Furthermore, the 2014 UNHCR study groups family reunification together
with opportunities abroad as one unified motive for migration. Eighty-one percent of the
404 children interviewed fall into this category.
The immigrant populations from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in the
United States rose by twenty-five percent from 2007 to 2015, while the number of
Mexican immigrants decreased by six percent during this period (Cohen et al. 2017).
Lorenzen (2017) finds the motivation of family reunification was greater for younger,
female migrants. Furthermore, Salvadoran children were much more likely than
Guatemalans and Hondurans to cite family reunification as a motivation for their journey.
Salvadorans have indeed forged greater social networks with relatives living in the
United States given previous waves of Salvadoran migration. The Salvadoran diaspora in
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the United States is the largest Central American community, with one in five
Salvadorans living in the United States (Brick et al. 2011, Lorenzen 2017). As Central
American immigrant populations expand in the United States, thousands of children are
left behind parentless. Many of these children, lacking a sense of community and support
to anchor them to their home country, follow in their parent’s migratory footsteps
(Kennedy 2014, Nazario 2014, Donato et al. 2015).
United States immigration policy
United States immigration policy and border enforcement actions have long been
cited as potential pull factors for illegal immigration, especially as it regards the recent
surges in unaccompanied child migration from the Northern Triangle. One program in
particular, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), has gained notoriety in
the media for apparently enticing more children to migrate illegally to the United States.
On June 15, 2012, United States President Barack Obama established the DACA
program, which granted a temporary reprieve from deportation, as well as work
authorization, for qualifying young migrants who entered the United States illegally as
minors. To qualify under the DACA program, illegal migrants had to (1) be under the
age of 31 by June 15, 2012 and be physically present in the United States on that date, (2)
have arrived in the United States before age 16, (3) lived continuously in the United
States since June 15, 2007, and (4) be enrolled in/graduated from high school or be a
veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces. Applicants had to also be free from any felony
convictions or a major misdemeanor and have no more than three minor misdemeanors.
Recipients were required to renew their work permits every two years (Alulema 2019).
As of March 31, 2020, there are 643,560 active DACA recipients. Mexicans make up the
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largest number of DACA recipients, or approximately eighty percent of the total, while
Salvadorans make up close to four percent of the total. Guatemala and Honduras
contribute 2.6 and 2.4 percent of total active DACA recipients respectively (CIS 2020).
The future of DACA recipients remains tenuous, however. On September 5,
2017, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Elaine Duke rescinded DACA, following
Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III’s recommendation that the program was a
“circumvention of immigration laws” and an “unconstitutional exercise of authority by
the Executive Branch”. Federal litigation ensued, and on June 18, 2020 in a 5-4 decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled against the rescission. The ruling, however,
still allows the Department of Homeland Security to reconsider the policy anew, under
the right conditions (Department of Homeland Security et al. v. Regents of the University
of California et al. 591 U.S. 2020).
An argument can be made that the DACA program has exacerbated the problem
of unaccompanied child migration from the Northern Triangle given the perception that
the United States will provide safe haven to such minors, whether this perception
becomes reality or not (Raphel 2014, Carlson et al. 2015). The literature to date,
however, points to a lack of correlation between DACA and the UAC surge at the United
States southern border (Wong 2014, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2016). First, only children
who lived continuously in the United States prior to June 15, 2007 were eligible for
DACA relief. Therefore, new child migrant arrivals would not qualify for protection
from deportation under the DACA program. Nonetheless, the perception that they could
qualify for protection in the future remains, especially given the prevalent use of
smugglers who provide migrants with false information. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2016)
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points instead to the 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) as a greater force than DACA in attracting child migrants
to the United States. The TVPRA law was intended to address the escalating issue of
human trafficking of children into the United States. The law requires that
unaccompanied minors arriving in the United States, with exception of those arriving
from countries that share a border with the United States, have to be transferred to the
custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within 72 hours. The ORR is
responsible for holding them until they can be released to a suitable family member in the
United States. The children then wait for a hearing, which can take several years given
the backlog in child migration cases. Previous to the requirements of TVPRA, the
Department of Homeland Security had the authority to return unaccompanied minors
using expediated procedures, which they still do for unaccompanied Mexican migrant
children. Consequently, many more Mexican children are immediately repatriated back
home as compared to those from the Northern Triangle countries. Immediate repatriation
for children from contiguous countries is possible as long as the DHS determines that the
minor is not a victim of a severe form of trafficking or in threat of being trafficked. The
caveat is that the minor is expected to make an independent decision to withdraw their
immigration application (GAO 2015). A 2015 U.S. Government Accountability Office
report finds that when it comes to Mexican UAC, the Customs and Border Protection
Agency, which is responsible for the majority of UAC apprehensions, does not
consistently implement these policies. On the basis of interviews conducted, they found
that not all CBP agents were aware that UAC under the age of 14 are presumed unable to
make an independent decision.
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After the law went into effect, which essentially protected Central American
children from immediate deportation, word of the new “permiso” that was being granted
spread throughout the Central American community (Chishti et al. 2015). Since the
announcement of DACA overlapped with the beginning of the surge in unaccompanied
child migration in 2012, however, it was incorrectly seen that DACA was attracting
greater child migrants to the United States. In reality, it was TVPRA that had the
significant impact on unaccompanied child migrant numbers from the Northern Triangle
countries. When analyzing the effect of both laws, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2016) find
that the effect of DACA on UAC apprehensions in 2012 and 2013 becomes statistically
insignificant when various push and pull factors are also included in the analysis. The
push factors considered were the homicide rate and real GDP per capita of the sending
countries, and the pull factors included U.S. real median weekly earnings and the U.S.
unemployment rate. In contrast to DACA, the TVPRA remained highly statistically
significant in explaining UAC apprehensions, despite controls for push and pull factors
and the number of border patrol agents and lawful permanent residents admitted by
country. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2016) link TVPRA and the rise in unaccompanied
child migration from the Northern Triangle to the prolonged period that these children are
allowed to stay in the United States with family members pending their hearings. While
knowledge of U.S. immigration policy was not explicitly stated as a reason for migration,
the importance of family reunification was consistently mentioned by child migrants
throughout the literature (Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014, Lorenzen 2017). Furthermore,
problems with the parametric model used in Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2016) prevent the
findings from being conclusive. First, the dataset the regression was based on ended with
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2013, which did not include the years of the surge. Second, including dummy variables
for TVPRA and DACA left little variability in the already limited dataset. Third, and
most importantly, while controls for border patrol agents were included, this data is not
appropriate for panel data analysis. The dependent variable was UAC apprehensions by
country, as were several of the independent variables, leading to the use of a panel data
model. Border patrol agents, however, are assigned to enforce U.S. immigration overall,
and not by country of origin.
Social globalization
With increased digital interconnectedness, the prospect of reuniting with family
living abroad becomes more accessible. These links can be measured both by the social
network ties present between immigrants already living abroad and the remittances they
send back home (De Hass 2011, Czaika et al. 2014). Czaika et al. (2014) asserts that
globalization has reinforced migrant networks and transnational ties by allowing migrants
to stay connected to family, to remit funds, and to travel back and forth between
destination and origin countries more easily. Furthermore, De Haas (2011) finds that
greater access to global information sources through television and cellular/internet
networks seem to have increased people's willingness to migrate, given greater awareness
of the opportunities abroad. In addition, financial interconnectedness, especially through
remittances received from family members living abroad, are a significant source of
income supplementation and may, in fact, be an even more stable source of income
(Edwards et al. 2003, Gammage 2006). Remittances, and the increased spending they
facilitate, are an important contribution to real gross domestic income per capita for
developing countries, particularly those of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
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Mexico (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). This reliance
on remittances creates a further tie to relatives living abroad. Edwards et al. (2003) finds
that remittances have a large significant effect on school retention, particularly for urbandwelling children. The authors find that remittances have a stronger impact on school
retention rates than other types of income. Furthermore, remittances are also tied to
funding additional migration. As an increasing number of migrants from these four
countries settle in the United States, they facilitate subsequent migration and family
reunification through their rising remittance spending (Czaika et al. 2014). Social
globalization, in other words, captures not only the way in which migrants have remained
connected to their source countries, but it also measures the information and financial
flows necessary for undertaking a migratory journey. Social globalization has
significantly decreased the intervening obstacles normally present in migration (Lee
1966).
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CHAPTER IV – DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This research relies on both parametric and nonparametric analysis in order to
achieve robustness and statistical power. Parametric statistical testing is conducted to
determine if changes in the well-being of young adults in each country, as well as
economic and social links to relations living abroad, entice greater child migration
numbers. Nonparametric testing is conducted on the errors of the regression. First, to
ascertain that the errors are normally distributed and that the parametric t-test is
appropriate, and second to verify that the errors are homoscedastic. Tests of
multicollinearity, cross-sectional dependence, and autocorrelation are also presented.
Additional nonparametric statistical testing is then conducted to determine if the
population distributions of the four countries in this study are statistically similar, and
whether child migration from these four countries should be studied as one, singular
phenomenon. Finally, change point detection is employed to determine, more precisely,
in which time periods significant changes occurred in the mean and variance of UAC
migration data.
A novel dataset
Quantitative data is obtained from a variety of governmental and nongovernmental sources for the years 2008 to 2018, which includes the time period of the
surge in migrant child arrivals from the Northern Triangle countries. Data on
Unaccompanied Alien Children arriving at the United States southern border is obtained
from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Unaccompanied Alien Children apprehensions serves as a proxy for
child migration to the United States. The proxy is supported given evidence that
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unaccompanied children arriving from Central America and Mexico often surrender to
United States border patrol agents in order to claim asylum (American Immigration
Council 2015, Cheatham 2019, DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council 2019).
United States Customs and Border Protection data is obtained through CBP releases
(CBP 2018) and by petitioning the DHS through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The data obtained from the DHS FOIA request includes UAC monthly apprehensions by
country of origin from October 2006 to April 2018 (CBP 2020). Unaccompanied alien
children apprehension data is first reconciled between the public releases available
through the CBP statistics website and the FOIA dataset received, and then the FOIA
dataset is converted from fiscal year to calendar year.
Data on the push and pull factors of migration were obtained from the United
Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, Instituto Igarape, and the KOF Swiss
Economic Institute. The United Nations Development Programme contributes variables
tied to the Human Development Index, such as expected years of schooling at school
entrance age (UNDP 2018). The World Bank contributes unemployment rates of youth
ages 15 to 24, from the modeled International Labour Organization (ILO) estimate
(World Bank Group 2020a). Instituto Igarape provides a comprehensive dataset on
homicides for Latin America and the Caribbean, collected directly from national police,
ministries of the interior, justice, defense and health departments, national statistical
offices and national institutes of legal medicine and forensic studies. The database is
continuously updated and verified through its national, regional, and international
partners, including various international universities, thinktanks, and public-private
partnerships (Instituto Igarape 2019, 2020). Through the Instituto Igarape database, data
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on homicides in El Salvador are obtained through the Institute of Legal Medicine,
Supreme Court of El Salvador. Data on homicides in Guatemala are obtained through the
national police, the Policia Nacional Civil (PNC). Data on homicides for Honduras are
obtained through the Observatorio de la Violencia, a joint partnership between the United
Nations and the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH). Data on
homicides for Mexico are obtained through the Ministry of Government, Executive
Secretariat of the Public Security National System. The data available for public use was
further corroborated through a request received directly from Instituto Igarape.
While there is no global data on family reunification specifically, family
reunification remains an important driver for children traveling alone (UNICEF n.d.).
Furthermore, the definition of family is too often narrowly defined. The United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) recognizes family members as persons
with whom the child has a strong personal relationship (UNCRC 2013). Therefore, in the
absence of more well-defined measures of family reunification, the strength of the
connections of personal relationships, as measured through the KOF Social Globalization
de facto Index, is an appropriate measure. The KOF Swiss Economic Institute, upon
request, provided a further breakdown of their globalization index data into the three subindices of globalization, as well as the individual normalized variables included in the
indices. Globalization data was also broken down between de facto and de jure
globalization. Separating out the sub-indices of the Social Globalization Index was
further considered for use in the regression model. However, incorporating only
Informational Globalization or Interpersonal Globalization proved less meaningful in
measuring the extent of interconnectedness between source and destination country
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populations. Furthermore, Cultural Globalization did not exhibit enough variation to be
considered individually. Finally, Social Globalization de facto was chosen over de jure
in order to better measure the actionable impacts of globalization, rather than the policies
intended towards that purpose (KOF 2019). The components of the KOF Social
Globalization Index de facto are described in more detail later in this section.
To properly measure the push and pull factors present in UAC migration and
address the research questions more robustly, a novel dataset is created. This panel
dataset is used in conjunction with both parametric and nonparametric statistics. First, in
order to examine the relationship between specific push-pull factors and UAC migration
using parametric regression, annual UAC apprehension data from the CBP is combined
with unemployment data from the World Bank, schooling data from the United Nations
Development Programme, homicide data from Instituto Igarape, and globalization data
from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute. Second, to test the similarity of the four source
country populations in terms of the push factors of UAC migration, the Human
Development Index is also included as an overall measure of population well-being in
each country. The KOF Social Globalization de facto Index served to measure the pull
factors of UAC migration for each country. Finally, monthly UAC apprehension data is
also incorporated for mean and variance changepoint detection.
In compiling data from organizations across the private-public spectrum, as well
as from organizations devoted to particular issues such as globalization or human
development, an innovative approach for data analysis is taken. Instead of relying
exclusively on a single source for information, this dataset goes to the heart of
quantitative data collection techniques. For example, the homicide rate is not only
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obtained from local sources, but through Instituto Igarape, only homicides from verifiable
sources are included. While this ensures the greatest accuracy, consistency is also
maintained by relying on imputed estimates from international organizations when locallevel data is unavailable. For example, if local labor market indicators were relied on
exclusively, the results of the model would be affected by limited nationally reported data
from Guatemala. Therefore, to gauge the labor market conditions of youth, only modeled
ILO youth unemployment rates are used as opposed to local calculations for this
particular variable of interest. The ILO estimates provide a complete panel data set of
internationally comparable variables, where missing data is imputed using econometric
modeling (ILO 2020). A similar approach is relied upon for measuring globalization. By
using the KOF index, any missing variables are imputed using linear interpolation. In
addition, consistency is also maintained by including only what can be measured. More
precise measures of human development indicators may exist beyond the Human
Development Index, but they are not consistent across countries. The HDI in its
simplicity of breaking down human development to its most basic components of
income, knowledge, and health, is available consistently across years and countries.
Moreover, accuracy and consistency are particularly important when it comes to
measuring UAC apprehensions, the main variable of interest in this study. Not only was
data obtained directly from the source of the apprehensions, the U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol, but the public figures are further verified through an additional FOIA request of
monthly apprehension data by country of origin. In fact, several discrepancies were
found between the public press releases available on the CBP website and the FOIA
figures obtained. Therefore, monthly UAC apprehension data for each country is used to
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tally yearly figures, and then to convert them into calendar year figures rather than the
reported fiscal year figures. The result is a comprehensive dataset that is more reliable
and updated than that which could be obtained from a single, public source. In addition,
the time period of this study, from 2008 to 2018, includes the years of the surge in
migrant children coming from the Northern Triangle countries. This is crucial for
attaining reliable results since this data was previously unavailable for analysis. The list
of variables used in this research and their respective sources can be found in Appendix
A. Each variable in the dataset is described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
As mentioned previously, measures of a population’s well-being are incorporated
into the dataset for each source country as potential push factors (Lee 1966) and have
been obtained from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme.
The unemployment rates of youth (ages 15-24) is included as a measure of the health of
the job market for young people. Including the unemployment rates of youth is more
meaningful as it captures specifically the hardship that young, potential migrants are
facing (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015). A 2015 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report shows that sixty-one percent of UAC apprehensions between 2009 and
2014 were of youth between the ages of 16 and 17 years old. If fourteen and fifteen-yearolds are included, that number rises to eighty-four percent. The trend of predominantly
teen migration remains even in later years. According to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, in fiscal year 2018 approximately seventy-three percent of all
unaccompanied minors referred for resettlement were over 14 years of age (DHHS 2020).
Furthermore, unemployment rates are chosen over labor force participation rates as an
explanatory variable since they are intrinsically tied to both the labor force participation
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and the employment to population ratio (ILO 2018). In this way, unemployment rates not
only reflect the desire to participate in the labor force, but employment opportunities as
well.
Expected years of schooling for a child at school entrance age is included in the
dataset to account for investments and engagement in human capital. It measures the
number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive in
each country, if the current age-specific enrollment rates persist throughout the child’s
life. This is a better gauge of total schooling obtained since it doesn’t rely on enrollment
rates for only a particular stage of education (Roser 2019). It is important to note that
increased school enrollment rates may affect national income and labor force
participation rates adversely in the short term, yet could lead to higher economic growth
rates and standards of living in the longer term (Perotti 1993, Lucas 1998). More
pointedly, increased school enrollment rates can be a signal of the optimism of students
in future labor market opportunities.
Homicide rates are also included in the dataset as a measure of the safety and
security conditions of the source country. Increased homicides rates affect a number of
social well-being indicators, including perceptions of personal safety, as well as
reductions in life expectancy (Canudas-Romo et al. 2019, OECD 2020). Exposure to
violence, as measured by rising homicide rates, has been cited extensively in the
literature as a further push factor in child migration (Kennedy 2014, Wong 2014,
Swanson et al. 2016, Lorenzen 2017).
When seen at the individual country level, however, increased homicide rates and
UAC migration numbers do not appear to move together. This would call into question
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one of the main motives reflected in the survey responses of migrant children found in
the literature. For example, in 2008 the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants stood at
57.9 in Honduras, 51.9 in El Salvador, 46 in Guatemala, and 13.1 in Mexico. Over the
next decade, homicide rates remained high, but erratic, across the four countries.
Guatemala’s homicide rate, however, began steadily decreasing after 2009 and yet child
migrant numbers continued to rise precipitously. Furthermore, Mexico’s homicide rate
from 2008 to 2018 remained significantly below that of the Northern Triangle countries
at an average of 18.8, compared to an average of 65.8 in Honduras, 63.1 in El Salvador,
and 34.4 in Guatemala. More pointedly, prior to 2014 Mexican UAC apprehensions
exceeded those of the Northern Triangle countries despite homicides in Mexico
remaining well below the Northern Triangle rates. From 2013 to 2014, the number of
Mexican child migrants fell by seventeen percent, while Northern Triangle child migrants
rose on average eighty-eight percent. Furthermore, homicide rates had actually fallen
over this period for all countries except El Salvador (Instituto Igarape 2020). In fact, in
2018 Guatemala had the lowest homicide rate of the four countries, and yet contributed
the largest number of UACs apprehended at the United States southern border, an
increase from the previous year of over seventy-two percent. El Salvador contributed the
lowest number of UAC in 2018, and yet had the highest homicide rate of the four
countries (CBP 2018, Instituto Igarape 2020). Table 1 depicts homicide rates, per
100,000 of the population, compared to UAC apprehension numbers at the United States
southern border for the years 2008-2018. The shaded bars represent the intensity of the
variable displayed. The data reflects that homicide rates do not rise and fall in line with
child migration numbers across the three Northern Triangle countries and Mexico.
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Table 1
UAC apprehensions and homicide rates by country
El Salvador
UAC Homicides
1327
51.9
1321
71.2
1815
64.7
1676
70
3675
40.8
7203
39.6
15878
61.1
12830
103
18385
81
4258
60.1
4949
50.3

Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018*

Guatemala
UAC Homicides
1384
46
1125
46.3
1508
41.5
1876
38.6
4639
34.7
10148
34
16265
31.6
17293
29.5
20029
27.3
12928
26
22327
22.5

Honduras
UAC Homicides
1515
57.9
957
66.8
920
77.5
1256
86.5
3512
85.5
8805
79
16035
68
7404
60
12305
59
4914
43.6
10913
40.3

Mexico
UAC Homicides
3616
13.1
17493
15.8
13253
20.1
11767
21.9
14971
20.6
17589
17.2
14446
14.5
11112
14.8
12004
18.5
8356
23.4
10136
26.7

Note: 2018 data was obtained through CBP releases only
Human Development Index to measure push factors
The push factors of child migration used in this research are in line with the wellbeing indicators used as part of the United Nation’s Human Development Index. The
HDI is a summary measure of various key dimensions of human development in a
country. Certainly, a decent standard of living is imperative for development, but so is
the ability to lead a long, healthy life and the opportunity of gaining knowledge. The
HDI is comprised of three sub-indices capturing changes in a population’s GNI per
capita, mean and expected years of schooling, and life expectancy. The HDI assigns
equal weights to all dimensions of human development, as well as equal weights to the
two education sub-indices (UNDP 2020). The components of the HDI are shown in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Components of the Human Development Index

According to the United Nations Development Programme, the standard of living
dimension in a country is measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita. National
income, also known as national production (or its more-geographically limited
counterpart, Gross Domestic Product) has been used exhaustively in the literature to link
economic growth to increased well-being in a country’s standard of living (Ahuvia et al.
1998; Cox et al. 2002; Easterly 1999, McGillivray et al. 2006). Ahuvia et al. (1998)
show a strong relationship between measures of subjective well-being and economic
growth in less developed countries, but Easterly (1999) cautions that these changes in
quality of life are lagged in relation to growth and not distributed evenly. In other words,
the well-being of a population cannot be measured on gains in income alone. Therefore,
the HDI incorporates two other measures of well-being into its index: a measure of health
and a measure for knowledge. In the education index, two indicators for attaining
knowledge are measured: mean years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected
years of schooling for children of school entering age. Expected years of schooling is a
measure of the number of years of schooling that a child entering school can expect to
receive, if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrollment rates persist throughout the
child’s life. Life expectancy at birth is used to generate the life expectancy index of the
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HDI and is considered an appropriate measure of the health conditions prevalent in a
country (UNDP 2013).
Otoiu et al. (2014) explores the relevance of the variables used in various indices
of well-being by performing cluster analysis, validating the HDI as a reliable measure of
well-being for a given country. Hagerty et al. (2001), in comparing various quality of life
indices, find that the HDI is reliable in assessing development across countries given its
aggregation of widely reported variables. The simplicity of the HDI, however, is also a
limitation. In other words, the HDI can only give a limited picture of human
development, it is not satisfactory in representing the totality of the life experiences and
conditions of a population.
KOF Globalization Index to measure pull factors
The KOF Globalization index is one of the most frequently used indices of
globalization by researchers, encompassing a panel dataset of 203 countries spanning
from 1970 to 2017 (Gygli et al. 2019, KOF 2019). The original KOF index was
introduced by Dreher (2006) and updated in Dreher et al. (2008). Gygli et al. (2019)
introduces a revised version of the index that distinguishes between de facto and de jure
measures along the different dimensions of globalization. As Potrafke (2015) shows, the
KOF index has been used in over 100 studies on the effects of globalization on various
outcome variables.
While the literature points to U.S. immigration policies (Amuedo-Dorantes et al.
2016), in conjunction with family reunification (Kennedy 2014, Nazario 2014, UNHCR
2014, Lorenzen 2017) as a pull factor of migration, the increased interconnectedness of
the origin and destination populations appear to be a facilitating factor (De Haas 2011,
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Czaika et al. 2014). The extent of interconnectedness, or globalization, can be measured
within three dimensions: economic, political, and social. Economic globalization is
characterized by the flow of goods, services, and capital over long distances, as well as
the information that accompanies these market exchanges. Political globalization is
characterized by a diffusion of government policies. Social globalization is characterized
by the spread of ideas, information, images, and people. This last category, social
globalization, is the one that best measures personal relationship interconnectedness. For
example, interpersonal globalization, a part of social globalization, measures the direct
interactions of people living in different countries. This interaction can occur by means
of personal calls across borders, as measured by international voice traffic in minutes per
capita using both fixed and mobile telephones. However, it can also occur through
personal contact, as is the case with international tourism, international students, and the
size of the foreign-born population in a country. In addition, international transfers of
money always involve some form of personal interaction, and so contribute to a greater
interconnectedness of the populations. Furthermore, while interpersonal globalization
measures personal interactions, informational globalization measures the flow of ideas,
knowledge, and images (Gygli et al. 2019). Used internet bandwidth serves as a proxy
for international digital information sharing, while international patent applications and
high technology exports measure the inflow and outflow of technology and scientific
ideas. Lastly, cultural globalization measures the international dispersion of cultural
values. In practice, cultural globalization has often been tied to the spread of Western or
American values (Hopper 2007, Gygli et al. 2019). The transmission of cultural values
can be linked to trade in cultural goods and services, such as movies, television series,
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music, works of art, etc. across borders. This is particularly relevant when considering
migration from Central America and Mexico to the United States, where the spread of
American culture and values is reflected not only in the growing trade in cultural goods
(UNESCO 2020), but in strong ties to family members that migrated previously.
Children appear to be particularly susceptible to this growing interconnectedness, citing
family reunification in the United States as a common motive behind their journey
(Kennedy 2014, UNHCR 2014, Lorenzen 2017, Schmidt 2017).
The three sub-components of the KOF Social Globalization Index are shown in
Table 2. The de facto index is specifically chosen over the de jure index in order to
measure the actual interconnectedness of the population, rather than the presence of
policies that would enable it. Each sub-component of the Social Globalization Index is
equally weighted and comprised of individual-weighted variables (KOF 2020).
Table 2
Components of the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index
A. Interpersonal Globalization
International voice traffic
Transfers
International tourism
International students
Migration
B. Informational Globalization
Used internet bandwidth
International patents
High technology exports
C. Cultural Globalization
Trade in cultural goods
Trade in personal services
International trademarks
McDonald's restaurant
Ikea stores
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The following two research questions are formulated based on the push and pull
factors of migration (Lee 1966, Donato et al. 2015), and are tested using parametric
regression:
R1: Do lower rates of school attendance and higher unemployment rates among
young adults, along with higher homicide rates, contribute to greater child migration?
R2: Does greater global economic and social interconnectedness contribute to
greater child migration?
The following research question addresses the distribution of the populations of
the four countries included in this study, and is tested using nonparametric analysis for
unrelated samples:
R3: Are the social and economic conditions faced by the populations of three
Northern Triangle countries and Mexico similar?
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3 for the variables used in this
research. This includes the dependent variable, UAC apprehensions, as well as the push
and pull factors used as explanatory variables. The data is represented in annual figures
from 2008 to 2017. Since KOF Social Globalization de facto Index data was not
available for 2018, all descriptive statistics are only shown through 2017. Over this time
period, on average 8,444.825 unaccompanied children were apprehended, with a standard
deviation of 6,317.236. The range, or difference between the minimum and maximum
values, is 19,109, indicating significant dispersion in the dataset for UAC apprehensions.
The push factors, including the youth unemployment rate, expected years of schooling,
and the homicide rate, have respective means of 8 percent unemployment, 11.7 years of
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expected schooling, and 46.6 homicides per 100,000 of the population. The standard
deviation of these push factors are 2.3 for youth unemployment, 1.3 for expected years of
schooling, and 24.2 for the homicide rate. The Social Globalization de facto Index, used
as a measure of the pull factors of migration, has a mean of 59.9 and a standard deviation
of 3.0.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Variable
UAC apprehensions
Youth unemployment
Expected years school
Homicide rate
Social globalization

N
Mean
Median Variance
SD
Range
40 8444.825 7880.0 39907473.6 6317.236 19109.0
40
8.148
8.524
5.302
2.303
9.237
40 11.673
11.400
1.650
1.284
4.100
40 46.565
42.550
584.405
24.174
89.900
40 59.906
59.041
9.100
3.017
10.702

Visualization of the data is shown in figures 4 through 8 on the following pages.
These figures provide a context for the descriptive statistics provided in Table 3. Figure
4 shows UAC apprehensions from all four source countries over the time period 2008 to
2017. High variability is present in UAC apprehensions, as indicated by the variance and
standard deviation. Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 show youth unemployment rates, expected
years of schooling, homicide rates, and social globalization respectively. Lower levels of
variability are evident in youth unemployment rates and the KOF social globalization
index, with particularly low variability for expected years of schooling. Higher
variability, however, is present in the homicide rate.
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Figure 4. UAC Apprehensions

Figure 5. Youth unemployment rates
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Figure 6. Expected years of schooling

Figure 7. Homicide rates

52

Figure 8. KOF Social Globalization de facto Index

Fixed effects model
A parametric, fixed-effects regression model is employed to measure how
changes in the push and pull factors of migration affect the overall number of
unaccompanied child migrants arriving at the United States southern border from the
Northern Triangle and Mexico. The fixed effects model controls for time invariant
changes between the countries included in this study. In other words, the model is
appropriate for evaluating changes within each country (Torres-Reyna 2007). It permits
heterogeneity among countries by allowing different intercepts for different countries
(Gujarati et al. 2009).
Using a distributed lag, fixed effects model, a least squares regression is
performed for panel data over the years 2008-2017 on the three Northern Triangle
countries and Mexico. Data for 2018 was not included in the regression model since the
KOF Social Globalization Index was available only through 2017. Since the factors that
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enable migration take time to surface, lagging the independent variables is recommended.
Lagging independent variables is appropriate where the dependent variable doesn’t react
fully to changes in the explanatory variables within the same time period (Hill et al.
2011; Nau 2018). For example, homicide rates do not escalate overnight, and the
decision to migrate may be the product of months of consideration. In addition, plans for
family reunification take time, as well as the accumulation of resources necessary to
make the trip.
The model also contains a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable.
This transformation facilitates the analysis for percent changes in child migration. More
pointedly, it facilitates the interpretation of how well-being and social globalization
indicators affect percentage changes in child migration over the time period of study.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of UAC apprehensions at the United
States southern border, serving as a proxy for child migration. The explanatory variables
include a measure of economic well-being, the unemployment rate of young adults (ages
15-24), as well as a measure of human capital engagement, expected years of schooling at
school entrance age. Furthermore, a social well-being indicator tied to life expectancy,
homicide rates (per 100,000 of the population), is included. These three independent
variables are considered push factors in child migration if they lead to worsening
economic opportunities for young adults, idleness, and increased insecurity (Lee 1966,
Kennedy 2014, Wong 2014, Chishti et al. 2015, De Hoyos et al. 2016b, Seelke 2016,
Swanson et al. 2016, Canudas-Romo et al. 2019). In addition, to gauge the pull factors
of migration the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index is incorporated as an
explanatory variable. It is used both as a measure of social network linkages between the
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populations of the source countries and the greater outside world, as well as the financial
flows that strengthen that link (De Hass 2011, Czaika et al. 2014, Kennedy 2014, Chishti
et al. 2015, Gygli et al. 2019). Since the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index
already includes measures necessary for family reunification, a separate measure for this
will not be included. For example, the Index includes international voice traffic and used
internet bandwidth which would capture the telecommunications aspect of remaining
connected to family, as well as secondary income (i.e. remittances) paid and received
which would capture the financial connection.
The parametric regression model is described as follows:
lnUACit = β0 + β1URyouthi,t-1 + β2ExpectedSchoolingi,t-1 + β3Homicidesi,t-1 + β4Social
globalization indexi,t-1 + αi + εit
where t-1 indicates time lagged by one year, i indicates country, and α is the
control for fixed country effects. The dependent variable is transformed into its natural
logarithmic form, which allows for a better fit with the conditions of a linear model and
limits the effects of outliers in the data (Wooldridge 2006).
The null and alternative hypothesis for the regression model are:
H01: Changes in well-being in the home country, along with exposure to increased
social globalization, does not affect unaccompanied child migration.
Ha1: Changes in well-being in the home country, along with exposure to increased
social globalization, increases unaccompanied child migration.
Tests of the estimated regression model
In order to test that the assumptions of regression are met, several postestimation
tests are performed on the error term. These include tests on the requirement of
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normality, homoscedasticity, and independence of the residual. In addition, tests for
multicollinearity and cross-sectional dependence are also performed
Normality of the error term. In order to ascertain that the condition of normality
of the error term in linear regression is met, the Skewness and Kurtosis (SK) test for
panel data models is performed (Alejo et al. 2015). The test, an extension of the JarqueBera (SK) test, allows identification of departures from the Gaussian assumption in both
error term components of a panel regression model. The resulting test statistics have a
Chi2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. The null hypotheses indicate a skewness
equal to zero and kurtosis equal to 3, which is in line with that of a normal distribution
(Naghshpour 2016a).
The null and alternative hypotheses for both the individual-specific (ui) and the
remainder error component (eit) are:
H02Su&Ku: Su = 0 and Ku = 3

Ha2Su&Ku: Su ≠ 0 and Ku ≠ 3

H02Se&Ke: Se = 0 and Ke = 3

Ha2Se&Ke: Se ≠ 0 and Ke ≠ 3

Homoscedasticity of the error term. The condition of constant variance of the
error term is also tested to ensure compliance with the least squares assumption.
Homoscedasticity implies that the variance of the residual is constant (Wooldridge 2006).
Since this is a fixed effects model, the Modified Wald test for group-wise
heteroscedasticity is most suitable. The resulting test statistic has a Chi2 distribution, in
this case with four degrees of freedom.
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The null and alternative hypotheses are:
H03: The error term of the regression model has a constant variance
Ha3: The error term of the regression model does not have a constant variance
Multicollinearity. To judge whether the relationships between the variables is a
problem for the model, the presence of multicollinearity must be ruled out. First, a
correlation matrix is constructed to show the correlation coefficients between variables
with their respective p-values. As a further test for linear independence, the variance
inflation factor (VIF) is used to judge possible multicollinearity between the explanatory
variables in the regression model. If multicollinearity is present, this could render the
interpretation of the individual coefficients invalid. While there is no concrete rule to
deem the presence of multicollinearity a problem, a generally accepted rule of thumb is
that a VIF greater than 10 is a sign of serious multicollinearity issues that require
correction, while a VIF of 5 indicates some multicollinearity (Naghshpour 2016c, Penn
State Eberly College of Science 2019).
Cross-sectional dependence. For panel data models, cross-sectional dependence
may be a concern. However, cross-sectional dependence, when the residuals across
countries are related, tends to be more of a problem in macro models with extended time
series. It much less of a concern in micro models with limited times series (Torres-Reyna
2007), such as this one. Nonetheless, the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence is
conducted. The test statistic has a Chi2 distribution with six degrees of freedom.
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The null and alternative hypothesis are:
H04: No cross-sectional dependence
Ha4: Cross-sectional dependence
Mean of error term. A further assumption of linear regression is that the mean of
the residual is zero. This condition assumes that the distribution of the error term has a
zero mean and that there is no relationship between the explanatory variables and the
error term (Wooldridge 2006).
Autocorrelation. Serial correlation tends to also be more problematic for macro
models with extended time series, but less of a problem in micro models (Torres-Reyna
2007). In models with reduced time series such as this one, some serial correlation is
expected since it is the relationship between a variable and the lagged version of itself.
Serial correlation is tested using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data.
The following null and alternative hypotheses are presented:
H05: No first-order autocorrelation
Ha5: First order autocorrelation
Tests of population distributions
The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests are conducted on
the push and pull factors of each country to compare if the populations of these countries
differ significantly from each other. The push factors are tested using the Human
Development Index (HDI) and the pull factors are tested using the KOF Social
Globalization de facto Index.

58

Kruskal-Wallis/ Mann-Whitney U test on Human Development Index
Human Development data from the three Northern Triangle countries and Mexico
from 2008 to 2018 is tested to determine if the populations are significantly similar and
come from a common distribution. The intention is to gauge the similarity of the push
conditions of migration across all four countries, using the simplicity of an index that is
supported by the literature (Hagerty et al. 2001, Otoiu et al. 2014).
The null and alternative hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA test
on the push conditions in each country are:
H06: The distribution function of the HDI for the four populations are identical
Ha6: The distribution function of the HDI for the four populations are not identical
The distribution of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic approximates a Chi2
distribution. If the null hypothesis of the equality of the population distributions is
rejected, it would be necessary to determine which parameter is different by comparing
individual population distributions, one-at-a-time. Since the samples are not related, the
appropriate pairwise test is the Mann-Whitney U test. There are six pairwise
combinations, a combination of four countries, two at a time (Naghshpour, 2016b).
The null and alternative hypothesis for the Mann-Whitney U tests, for each
pairwise combination, are as follows:
H07: The difference between the medians of the populations for the HDI of the
two countries is zero.
Ha7: The difference between the medians of the populations for the HDI of the
two countries is different from zero.
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Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U test on KOF Social Globalization Index
Greater interconnectedness of the populations of the four countries to the global
world, through both social and financial linkages, is expected to increase migration (De
Hass 2011, Czaika et al. 2014). The KOF Social Globalization de facto Index considers
the importance of interpersonal, informational, and cultural globalization.
In order to ascertain whether the populations differ in terms of their
interconnectedness to the greater global world, the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA
test is again performed, but this time on the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index.
The null and alternative hypothesis on the pull conditions in each country are:
H08: The distribution function of the KOF Social Globalization Index for the four
populations are identical
Ha8: The distribution function of the KOF Social Globalization Index for the four
populations are not identical
If the null hypothesis of the equality of the population distributions is rejected, it
would be necessary to determine which parameter is different by comparing individual
population distributions, one-at-a-time. Once again, since the samples are not related, the
appropriate pairwise test is the Mann-Whitney U test for six pairwise combinations. The
null and alternative hypothesis for the Mann-Whitney U tests, for each pairwise
combination, are as follows:
H09: The difference between the medians of the populations for the KOF Social
Globalization Index of the two countries is zero.
Ha9: The difference between the medians of the populations for the KOF Social
Globalization Index of the two countries is different from zero.
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Change point detection
Change point detection (CPD) is used to identify abrupt changes in the trend of
monthly UAC apprehensions. It can further assist in identifying pivotal time periods
where major changes in migration occurred, including those possibly associated with
U.S. immigration policy. Change point detection is performed on both the mean and
variance of the UAC time series for each country. Major changes in the mean reflect that
the average number of children apprehended suddenly deviated from a previous average.
Major changes in the variance reflect that sudden changes in the volatility of UAC
apprehensions have occurred. The change point will indicate which month reflects a
break, or an abrupt change, in the mean and variance of the time series. For example, if
the mean changepoint occurs in February 2013, then beginning with March 2013 a new
mean was established that was significantly different from the previous mean.
The data and models included in this study reflect the best possible measures of
the push and pull factors of child migration. Nonetheless, inevitably the data is limited to
only that which it can be measured, which in turn informs the results of the models.
More pointedly, in selecting the data for this research, ample consideration is given to the
best possible measures of the economic conditions, investments in human capital, and
security concerns present as push conditions in the source countries. Careful
consideration was also given to the pull factors present in the United States for potentially
attracting these child migrants. However, not everything that is counted will account for
everything (Jahan 2020). Every effort is made in the analysis of results to reflect that
which can be accounted for.
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CHAPTER V RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
First, the parametric fixed effects model results are discussed in order to present
the significant push and pull factors of UAC migration that are common to the three
Northern Triangle countries and Mexico. Second, the results of the nonparametric
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests are discussed to highlight that there are, in
fact, significant differences in the push and pull conditions faced by the populations of
the four countries. Change point detection is then presented to tie the results of the
parametric model to the results of the nonparametric tests, by linking historical events
affecting migrant children from each of the four countries to their actual migratory
journey.
Fixed effects model
A parametric fixed effects regression is performed on the logarithmic
transformation of unaccompanied alien children apprehensions from 2008 through 2017.
Apprehensions are used as a proxy for unaccompanied child migration, supported by the
fact that the vast majority of migrant children voluntarily surrender to U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol agents. The explanatory variables are the lagged values of various push
and pull factors of migration as supported by the literature. The unemployment rate of
youth (ages 15-24) and expected years of schooling at school entrance age are used to
gauge young adult involvement in the labor force and educational system. The homicide
rate measures not only safety and security concerns, but serves as a well-being indicator
tied to life expectancy. The KOF Social Globalization de facto Index is used to evaluate
the interconnectedness of previous migrants with those left behind in the home country.
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In this way it serves to gauge the extent of these connections, as well as the feasibility of
family reunification.
The results of the regression performed on the log of UAC are shown in Table 4.
The results of the model reveal that the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the
alternative hypothesis given the F-statistic (p-value ≈ 0.0000). More pointedly, the push
and pull factors included in this model have strong explanatory power in accounting for
changes in UAC migration coming from the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico.
Table 4
Fixed effects regression results
Dependent variable: UAC apprehensions (log)
Explanatory variables (lag)
Youth unemployment rate
Expected years schooling
Homicide rate
Social globalization index
R2
within 0.7127
between 0.2592
overall 0.4837
Probability > F = 0.0000

Coefficient
0.1125
-0.5883
0.0036
0.5324
corr(u_i, Xb)
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

SE
0.0615
0.2065
0.0068
0.0623
-0.5884
0.7954
0.5518
0.6751

p-value
0.0770
0.0080
0.6000
0.0000

Three coefficients were found to be significant in explaining UAC migration: the
unemployment rate of youth, expected years of schooling, and the KOF Social
Globalization de facto Index. The youth unemployment rate has a positive relationship
with UAC migration with a p-value of 0.0770. While this relationship is the weakest of
the three variables in terms of its significance level, it still indicates a positive
relationship between higher unemployment and UAC migration. For every one percent
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rise in the youth unemployment rate, UAC migration increases by 11.25 percent. This
finding is supported by the literature where many young migrants, especially from
Guatemala and Honduras, claim to be seeking economic opportunity in the United States
given a lack of opportunity in their home countries (Seelke 2016, Lorenzen 2017).
Furthermore, expected years of schooling has a negative relationship with UAC
migration. For additional year of expected schooling, UAC migration decreases by 58.83
percent. This finding is significant not only in terms of its magnitude, but also because it
has a high significance level with a p-value of 0.0080. While a 58.83 percent increase in
migration may seem like a very large jump, it’s important to note that a) an additional
year of schooling is a relatively large increase in and of itself, and b) in some years, UAC
migration from the Northern Triangle increased upwards of 145 percent. The
significance of these two variables together supports previous research findings that the
growing NEET phenomenon in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico makes
young adults more susceptible to migration (Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015, Seelke 2016,
Kalsi 2018). More pointedly, these findings support the work of De Hoyos et al. (2016a)
and Muñoz-Pogossian et al. (2015) which find that young people in the Northern
Triangle and Mexico face greater risks when idle. Seelke (2016) adds that these
heightened risks increase the motivation to migrate. De Hoyos et al. (2016a) find that
Mexican NEETs that lived near organized criminal actors were more susceptible to gang
recruitment. Schmidt (2017) finds that several migrant children reported that being out of
work increases the chance of being recruited into a gang. However, despite repeated
findings from surveys and interviews of child migrants citing violence as a factor in their
decision to migrant, homicide rates did not prove to be significant in explaining UAC
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migration. One possible reason is that homicide rates may not be an adequate measure of
the overall safety and security conditions in a country. The 2014 United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees study of migrant children found that forty-eight percent of
respondents expressed that they were personally affected by the augmented violence of
criminal organizations in the region. Kennedy (2014), in interviewing child migrants
from El Salvador, finds that crime, gang threats, and violence were the strongest reasons
cited for migration. In fact, fifty-nine percent of Salvadoran boys and sixty-one percent
of Salvadoran girls cited one of those factors as a reason for their emigration. In other
words, the threat of violence may motivate migration, with that threat increasing due to
being out of work and out of school. However, actual homicide rates are not sufficient
for explaining the motivation behind UAC migration.
Furthermore, social globalization, which measures the interconnectedness of the
population of each country to the greater global world, appears to also have a tremendous
impact on unaccompanied child migration from the Northern Triangle countries and
Mexico. The KOF Social Globalization de facto Index proved the most statistically
significant coefficient with a p-value of approximately zero. According to the model, a
one-unit increase in the KOF Index increases UAC migration by 53.24 percent. Again,
the magnitude of this relationship must also be placed in context. A one-unit increase in
the KOF index is also a substantial jump. Over the ten-year period of this study, the KOF
Social Globalization de facto index fluctuated at most between a six-point change for any
one country. Furthermore, the Social Globalization de facto Index does not only reflect
increased telecommunications, but financial flows of remittances, and exposure to
cultural norms and values from abroad. It incorporates the three categories of
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interpersonal globalization, informational globalization, and cultural globalization. More
pointedly, social globalization not only increases awareness of opportunities abroad, but
it also permits the connections with family and friends that would facilitate migration.
As countries become more interconnected globally it is not only the flow of goods and
services that will increase, but also the flow of ideas which influences the flow of people.
This is also supported by the literature where the migration habits of the parents are
carried over to the children and further enabled through technology (Lee 1966, Donato et
al. 2015). Donato et al. (2015) find important links between the existence of migration
networks and the influence of a parent’s migratory patterns on a child’s decision to
migrate. The connections potential child migrants forge with previous migrants reduce
the uncertainty in the child’s own migration. As the populations of immigrants from
these countries grow in the United States, they facilitate further migration and family
reunification through remittance spending (Czaika et al. 2014). In fact, Kennedy (2014)
found that one in three Salvadoran children interviewed cited family reunification as the
primary reason for their migration, with over ninety percent of the children with at least
one parent residing in the United States. Schmidt (2017) finds that several children
referenced family reunions as motivating factors, but that often this was tied to problems
in the home or desires to help siblings and other relatives. Lorenzen (2017) further
dissects the factors of migration by evaluating them in relation to each other. He finds
that around one-third of child migrants had mixed motives for migration. While violence
did result as the most often cited reason for migration, it was cited mainly among those
children exhibiting mixed motives for migration. This was in contrast to the motive of
searching for better opportunities in the United States, which was most often cited as an
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exclusive reason. Minors citing both violence and economic opportunities were largely
male adolescents. Minors citing family reunification were mainly younger and female.
Furthermore, the author found very different motives between the children from different
countries. This can be tied back to the within R2 value obtained from the fixed effects
model. Over seventy-one percent of the variation in UAC migration within countries is
captured by the model, but only twenty-six percent of the variation between counties,
however, is captured by the model. This is further supported by rho, representing that
sixty-eight percent of the variance in the model is due to differences across the panels
(Torres-Reyna 2007). Therefore, the fixed effects model is good at indicating
commonalities in migration factors, while highlighting the variability and heterogeneity
present in each country.
The results of the fixed effects model address the first two research questions of
this study. The first question regards the push factors that influence child migration,
specifically school attendance rates, youth unemployment rates, and homicide rates. It
can be concluded with strong statistical certainty that school attendance rates matter for
UAC migration. School attendance, as captured by expected years of schooling at school
entrance age, estimated at prevailing enrollment rates, are statistically significant at the
one percent level. Unemployment rates are also statistically significant in explaining
UAC migration, but at the weaker eight percent significance level. Homicide rates,
however, are not good at explaining UAC migration from the Northern Triangle countries
and Mexico.
The second research question regards the pull factors of migration, specifically
the growing global interaction of societies, that permits knowledge sharing and long67

distance relationships. It can be concluded with strong statistical certainty that social
globalization, resulting in the greater global interconnectedness of populations, is
significant in explaining UAC migration. The model reveals that the Social
Globalization de facto Index is highly statistically significant with a probability
approaching zero.
The results of the regression model indicate that economic and educational
opportunities for young adults, together with the growing global interconnectedness of
societies, provide strong incentives for UAC migration from the Northern Triangle
countries and Mexico to the United States.
Tests of the estimated regression model
The following postestimation test results reveal that the assumptions of fixed
effects regression have been met. The estimates generated by the model remain the Best
Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE).
Skewness and Kurtosis (SK) test for panel data models. The joint test for
normality on the individual-specific error term, as well as the joint test for normality on
the remainder error component, indicate that the null hypotheses of skewness equal to
zero and kurtosis equal to 3 cannot be rejected. More pointedly, the error term of the
fixed effects regression model can be assumed to be normally distributed. The results of
the Skewness and Kurtosis (SK) test for panel data models is shown in Table 5.
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Table 5
SK test results for panel data models
Joint test for normality on e:

Chi2(2) = 0.23

Prob > Chi2 = 0.8929

Joint test for normality on u:

Chi2(2) = 2.39

Prob > Chi2 = 0.3021

The Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity. The results of the
Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in fixed effects models indicate that
the null hypothesis of constant variance in the error term cannot be rejected. In other
words, given a p-value of 0.4508 it can be determined with strong statistical certainty that
the error term is homoscedastic. The results of the Modified Wald test are shown in
Table 6.
Table 6
Modified Wald test results
Chi2 (4)
Prob > Chi2

3.68
0.4508

Correlation matrix. In order to gauge correlation between the explanatory
variables in the model, the correlation coefficients with their respective significance
levels are presented in Table 7. As is evidenced by the coefficients shown in bold, the
KOF Social Globalization de facto Index has a strong and significant correlation with the
other variables in the model. The strongest relationship is found between social
globalization and years of schooling. The p-value not only indicates high significance,
but the coefficient of correlation, measuring the strength of the relationship, is also quite
elevated. This aligns with the findings of Edwards et al. (2003), where remittances,
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which are a part of the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index, play a significant role in
school retention. This is further supported by Gammage (2006) and Czaika et al. (2014)
that link remittances to funding education. Homicides also have a significant relationship
with years of schooling, albeit a negative one. This is supported by the literature given
the increased risk that NEETs face in gang recruitment and further participation in
criminal organizations (De Hoyos et al. 2016a, Muñoz-Pogossian et al. 2015). The
negative relationship between homicides and social globalization is less intuitive, and the
correlation coefficient indicates a weak relationship between the two variables. The gang
epidemic in Central America is not only localized to the region. Transnational gangs,
such as MS-13 and Barrio 18, operate across borders with the assistance of the same
technologies that keep families connected globally. Mexico and the Northern Triangle
countries have substantial numbers of youth linked to transnational gangs operating in the
U.S. (Vittori 2006). Furthermore, while homicide rates are linked to the proliferation of
these transnational gangs (Meyer et al. 2019), they have exhibited variability across
countries over time, as previously shown in Table 1. For example, between 2012 and
2014 the truce between rival gangs in El Salvador significantly decreased the homicide
rate, but later proved to only have strengthened their power as homicide rates increased
considerably in 2015 (Seelke 2016). Social globalization also has a significant
relationship with the unemployment rate. This may be a relationship tied to increases in
virtual interconnectedness at the same time that the economic growth of the countries
suffered. The Northern Triangle countries have failed to generate sufficient employment
given the increases in their labor force. Poor economic conditions are a known push
factor of migration (UNDESA 2019), which contributes to the growing diaspora of
70

migrants abroad, and serves to create even more global social networks (Meyer et al.
2019). Years of schooling and the unemployment rate also have a significant positive
relationship, but again, the coefficient of correlation is relatively small. As labor force
prospects dwindle, greater education can lead to greater marketability. However, as
many young migrants have stated, greater education requires financial resources. As
employment becomes more elusive, economic and educational opportunities in the
United States become more attractive (Lorenzen 2017).
Table 7
Correlation Coefficients with p-values in italics

URyouth
Years school
Homicides
KOF social

URyouth
1.0000

Years school

0.3592
0.0247
0.1798
0.2734
0.3784
0.0175

1.0000
-0.4248
0.0070
0.8591
0.0000

Homicides

KOF social

1.0000
-0.3949
0.0129

1.0000

Variance Inflation Factor. While a correlation coefficient gives a numerical
indication of the degree of association, the variance inflation factor provides a more
formal multicollinearity detection method (Naghshpour 2016c). For the explanatory
variables in the model the mean VIF is 2.72, with expected years of schooling reflecting
the highest VIF of 4.05. Given these results, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is
not an issue in the model, despite the relationships reflected in the correlation matrix.
The results of the Variance Inflation Factor are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8
VIF organized in descending order
Explanatory Variable
Expected years schooling
Social globalization index
Homicide rate
Youth unemployment rate
Mean VIF

VIF
4.05
3.97
1.47
1.41
2.72

1/VIF
0.2470
0.2517
0.6802
0.7104

Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence. Cross-sectional dependence refers to the
interdependence of variables across units, or in this case countries, in panel data models.
The results of the test for cross-sectional dependence indicate that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected and therefore, cross-sectional dependence concerns can be eliminated.
The results of the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence are presented in Table 9.
Table 9
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence
Chi2 (6)

10.164

Prob > Chi2

0.1179

Mean of error term. Descriptive statistics for the error term are shown in Table
10. They reflect the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of the
residual. The results obtained reflect that the assumption of a mean of zero for the error
term is met.
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Table 10
Statistics on the error term

Residual

Mean
0.0000

SD
0.8454

Min
-1.5352

Max
1.7588

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. Serial correlation is a violation of the
independence of the error term and is more common in time series data than crosssectional data, especially in the case of cyclical data (Naghshpour 2016c). The results of
the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data are presented in Table 11. The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the five percent significance level, but can be rejected at
the weaker ten percent significance level. Since some autocorrelation was expected
given the limited time series of this dataset, the results are not overly concerning. In fact,
the regression model can be evaluated with clustered standard errors to address the
autocorrelation (Hanck et al. 2020). The results of the model remained essentially
unchanged, with the same significant coefficients but smaller standard errors. This
additional model is presented in Appendix A for reference.
Table 11
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
F statistic
Prob > F

6.424
0.0851

These postestimation tests indicate that the fixed effects model provides efficient
and unbiased estimates. Furthermore, the results of the model reveal that it does a good
job in explaining the variation within the countries included in this study. The variation
between the countries, however, warrants further testing.
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Tests of population distributions
The parametric fixed effects model is useful in explaining overall UAC migration
while accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries over time. However,
the model does not permit a closer look into the push and pull factors of UAC migration
specific to each country. To gauge these similarities and differences, the Kruskal-Wallis
and Mann-Whitney U nonparametric tests are conducted. The Human Development
Index is chosen to reflect the push conditions prevalent in the source countries, while the
KOF Social Globalization de facto Index is chosen to reflect the pull conditions from a
growing interconnectedness. The results of these tests indicate that the four countries in
this study cannot be viewed as a whole. The Northern Triangle countries and Mexico
exhibit very different characteristics in both well-being indicators and their links to the
global community.
Kruskal-Wallis/ Mann-Whitney U test on Human Development Index
The availability of data varies across countries and can limit comparative analysis
relying on more precise variables. El Salvador for example, tends to make available
consistent data on poverty and income inequality, while Guatemala has very limited data
on these indicators. The HDI index is widely supported in the literature as a generalized
indicator of well-being, with the understanding that it is a simplistic view of the
prevailing conditions. The advantage of the HDI is that it uses the basic components of
GNI per capita, years of schooling, and life expectancy, which are available across all
countries in this study. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the HDI, with three
degrees of freedom, and correcting for ties present in the data, reveals that the null
hypothesis of no difference between the populations of the countries can be rejected at a
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p-value of 0.0001. Since it can be concluded that the countries are statistically different,
the Mann-Whitney U test is then conducted to see where the differences lie. The results
of the Mann-Whitney U pairwise comparisons indicate that differences exist across all
countries. In other words, no two countries are considered to be statistically similar when
it comes to their HDI. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the HDI of the four
countries, as well as the Mann-Whitney U test pairwise comparisons, are shown in Table
12.
Table 12
Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U tests for the HDI
Kruskal-Wallis
Country
Guatemala
Honduras
El Salvador
Mexico

Rank Sum
159.5
100.5
301.0
429.0

Test statistic adjusted for ties: 35.927
degrees of freedom: 3
p-value: 0.0001

Mann-Whitney
El Salvador to Honduras
z statistic: -3.979
p-value: 0.0001
El Salvador to Guatemala
z statistic: -3.522
p-value: 0.0004
El Salvador to Mexico
z statistic: 3.981
p-value: 0.0001
Honduras to Guatemala
z statistic: 1.708
p-value: 0.0877
Honduras to Mexico
z statistic: -3.974
p-value: 0.0001
Guatemala to Mexico
z statistic: -3.974
p-value: 0.0001

The p-value between Honduras and Guatemala warranted further investigation
however, because while it is significant at the ten percent level (p-value = 0.0877), it was
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much higher than that of the other countries (p-values = 0.0001 for all other
comparisons). As mentioned previously, the HDI is composed of three indices: income,
education, and life expectancy. These individual indices were tested separately to see
which differed significantly for Guatemala and Honduras. The results of the MannWhitney U tests conducted on the three components of the HDI between Guatemala and
Honduras are shown in Table 13. The results reveal commonalities in the educational
attainment of the populations of the two countries. While the income and life expectancy
indices were statistically significant at the one percent level or less, the education index
was not statistically significant (p-value = 0.7176). Therefore, it can be concluded that
Guatemala and Honduras are statistically different from each other in terms of the wellbeing indicators used in the HDI, with the exception of the education index. It is not
surprising that Guatemala and Honduras are more similar than the other countries when it
comes to education. The education indices reflect much lower levels of schooling than
that of Mexico and El Salvador. Mexico, on average, achieves close to seven years of
schooling and El Salvador closer to six years. Honduras and Guatemala, however, barely
achieve five years of schooling for their population. The relative size of their rural
populations (World Bank Group 2020b) plays a significant role in their lower levels of
educational attainment.
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Table 13
Mann-Whitney U tests on HDI: Guatemala & Honduras
Components of HDI
Income Index
z statistic: 3.975
p-value: 0.0001
Education Index
z statistic: -0.362
p-value: 0.7176
Life Expectancy Index
z statistic: -2.892
p-value: 0.0038

Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U test on KOF Social Globalization Index
In terms of the pull factors of migration, the KOF Social Globalization de facto
Index measures the strength of the connections between the populations of each country
and the greater global world. While globalization in general has contributed to a growing
interconnectedness on all levels, social globalization in particular measures the extent to
which a country has globalized their social and cultural networks. The KOF Social
Globalization de facto Index, as mentioned previously, is made up of three components.
Interpersonal globalization measures the flow of people and finances, including
telecommunications and money transfers. Informational globalization measures the
sharing of ideas, including used internet bandwidth, innovation through international
patents, and technological exports. Cultural globalization measures the flow of goods
and services that express the norms and values of a culture.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is run on the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index of
all four countries in this study. The results of the test, with three degrees of freedom, and
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correcting for ties present in the data, reveals that the null hypothesis of no difference
between the populations of the countries can be rejected at a p-value of 0.0001. Since the
countries are statistically different, the Mann-Whitney U test is then conducted to see
where the differences lie. All four pair-wise comparisons showed highly significant pvalues below the one percent level, again except between Honduras and Guatemala. In
fact, the p-value between Honduras and Guatemala was equal to 0.8798. With a p-value
this large, the null hypothesis of the equality of the KOF between these two countries
cannot be rejected at any level. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the KOF Social
Globalization Index of the four countries, as well as the Mann-Whitney U test pairwise
comparisons, are shown in Table 14.
Table 14
Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney U tests on Social Globalization
Kruskal-Wallis
Country
Guatemala
Honduras
El Salvador
Mexico

Rank Sum
112
106
262
340

Test statistic adjusted for ties: 29.213
degrees of freedom: 3
p-value: 0.0001
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Mann-Whitney
El Salvador to Honduras
z statistic: -3.553
p-value: 0.0004
El Salvador to Guatemala
z statistic: -3.402
p-value: 0.0007
El Salvador to Mexico
z statistic: 2.646
p-value: 0.0082
Honduras to Guatemala
z statistic: 0.151
p-value: 0.8798
Honduras to Mexico
z statistic: -3.780
p-value: 0.0002
Guatemala to Mexico
z statistic: -3.780
p-value: 0.0002

Since it can be concluded with strong statistical certainty that three of the four
country populations differ significantly in terms of their exposure to social globalization,
additional testing is warranted just on the populations of Guatemala and Honduras. In
order to discover which component of the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index was
contributing to the elevated p-value, further Mann-Whitney U tests are run on the subcomponents of social globalization for these two countries. The results of the MannWhitney U tests conducted on the three components of the KOF Social Globalization de
facto Index between Guatemala and Honduras are shown in Table 15. While the
interpersonal and cultural indices were statistically significant at the one percent level or
less, the informational index was not statistically significant (p-value = 0.7624).
Therefore, it can be concluded that Guatemala and Honduras are statistically different
from each other in terms of interpersonal and cultural globalization, but not in terms of
informational globalization. In fact, Honduras and Guatemala both achieved lower
rankings in the informational globalization sub-category index of the Social Globalization
Index as compared to Mexico and El Salvador. Mexico achieved the highest ranking for
informational globalization, at an average of 89 over the period, followed by El Salvador
at an average of 78. Honduras and Guatemala both achieved an average index of 76.
Another important point was that both Guatemala and Honduras saw more variability in
the informational index over the time period of this study. Honduras had a minimum
index of 71 in 2008 and a high of 79 in 2014, falling again to 77 by 2017. Similarly,
Guatemala began at 70 in 2008 and grew to 78 by 2013-2015, falling to 77 in 2016 and
2017. Mexico, however, saw consistent increases in its index, from 86 in 2008 to a high
of 91 in 2017. El Salvador, on the other hand, saw rather larger jumps in its index, from
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68 in 2008 to 81 in 2017, but also exhibited some of the variability of Honduras and
Guatemala.
Other than the similarity of Guatemala and Honduras when it comes to
informational globalization, it cannot be said that these two countries are similar in terms
of the social globalization of their populations.
Table 15
Mann-Whitney U tests on Social Globalization: Guatemala & Honduras
Components KOF Social
Interpersonal Index
z statistic: -3.780
p-value: 0.0002
Informational Index
z statistic: 0.302
p-value: 0.7624
Cultural Index
z statistic: 2.570
p-value: 0.0102

The results of the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests on the HDI and
KOF Social Globalization de facto Index address the third research question of this study,
regarding the population distributions of three Northern Triangle countries and Mexico.
It can be concluded with strong statistical certainty that the social and economic
conditions of the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico, as measured by their
respective HDI and KOF Social Globalization de facto indices, are significantly different.
More pointedly, the populations of the four countries differ from each other in terms of
both the push and pull conditions of migration. The only similarities found were between
Guatemala and Honduras, and only as it regards educational attainment and informational
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globalization. Overall, however, it can be said that the factors which motivate child
migration from each country should not be treated as identical. Migration from the three
Northern Triangle countries is often treated as homogeneous, which is not justified from
a methodological standpoint.
Change point detection
If the push and pull conditions of UAC migration differ across the four countries,
UAC migration trends over the last decade cannot be analyzed in an aggregated manner.
Since the fixed effects parametric model identified economic conditions, educational
opportunities, and family reunification as significant explanatory variables, these are the
factors given most attention in addressing the major change points in UAC migration.
Change point detection (CPD) is performed on both the mean and variance of UAC
apprehensions from each of the four countries in this study.
The mean number of unaccompanied minor apprehensions from Mexico abruptly
increased in January 2009 and remained elevated through May 2014. Comparatively, the
mean number of UAC apprehended for all three Northern Triangle countries abruptly
increased in March 2013. While the mean number of Mexican UAC apprehensions
began to rise much earlier than those from the Northern Triangle, they had also begun
declining while those from Guatemala and El Salvador remained elevated. Guatemala
faced a double spike in mean UAC apprehensions, one in March 2013 and a higher jump
in November 2013. Mean UAC apprehensions for Guatemala remained high through the
end of 2018. El Salvador’s mean UAC apprehensions also remained high for the
majority of the time period, not seeing a major decrease until February 2017. Honduras,
however, saw its mean UAC abruptly decrease by August 2014.
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Increased volatility began in March 2014 for El Salvador and Guatemala, but for
Honduras increased volatility began much earlier in November 2013. Honduran child
migrants exhibited two periods of sharp variability changes. The first, beginning in
November 2013, corresponded with the peak of Honduran monthly UAC apprehensions.
The second, beginning in July 2014, corresponded with lower mean UAC apprehensions
but with some significant volatility still present. The variability in Mexican child
migrants slowed between June 2014 and September 2016 but returned thereafter despite
an abrupt reduction in mean apprehensions.
Change point detection, El Salvador
In conducting CPD for monthly UAC migration from El Salvador over the period
October 2006 to April 2018, change points in mean apprehensions were found in
February 2013 and again in January 2017. In terms of the variability, or variance of UAC
apprehensions, change points were found in February 2014 and January 2017. More
pointedly, the mean number of UAC apprehensions from El Salvador rose significantly
from March 2013 to January 2017. Greater volatility, or spread in the distribution of the
observations, was seen in UAC apprehensions over the period March 2014 through
January 2017. The mean number of UAC apprehensions from El Salvador experienced a
sudden increase a year before also experiencing increased volatility in these
apprehensions. After January 2017, both the mean number of apprehensions and their
variance decreased dramatically. The plots of the mean and variance changepoints for
UAC apprehensions from El Salvador are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Mean and variance changepoints for El Salvador
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis hit El Salvador hard, only achieving
between 1.4 and 2.2 percent growth from 2010 to 2013. Despite improvements in
inequality and poverty, however, these improvements did not transfer over to the labor
market, particularly for young adults. In 2013, half of the Salvadoran population was less
than 30 years old, and every year about 30,000 young Salvadorans enter the labor force
for the first time. Furthermore, growth in human development improvements had
slowed. Enrollment rates increased significantly only in pre-primary and primary school.
Secondary and tertiary enrollment rates advanced at a much slower pace. In 2012, El
Salvador ranked among the countries with the lowest public spending on its social
sectors, with only 3.5 percent of its GDP towards education. Basic education makes up
the bulk of this spending, with less than seventeen percent allocated to secondary and
tertiary education. Furthermore, in 2012 gross enrollment at the upper secondary level
was just forty-eight percent, well below regional averages. In 2013, approximately fiftyfive percent of these new labor force entrants had less than a secondary education, with
fifteen percent stating they could not find a job (World Bank Group 2014). This is
important in comparison with the 2013 spike in mean UAC migration rates from El
Salvador. Seelke (2016) finds a strong relationship between the displacement of youth
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and migration. The drastic rise in mean UAC migration from El Salvador lasted through
January 2017. One explanation for this is that Salvadoran children by and large were
citing family reunification as a strong motive for migration, much more so than the other
UAC groups (Kennedy 2014, Lorenzen 2017). Potential migrant children from El
Salvador have stronger migrant networks to rely on, as well as family members to house
them in the United States while they await their immigration hearings.
Change point detection, Guatemala
In conducting CPD for monthly UAC migration from Guatemala over the period
October 2006 to April 2018, change points in mean apprehensions were found in
February 2013 and again in October 2013. In terms of the variability, a change point was
identified only for February 2014. Mean Guatemalan UAC apprehensions first spiked in
the same month as El Salvador. However, Guatemala saw a second spike in mean UAC
apprehensions beginning in November of the same year. Increased variability began in
March 2014, one year after the first spike in mean UAC apprehensions. In other words,
the average number of unaccompanied minors from Guatemala began steadily increasing
from March 2013 onwards, but the variability was not present until one year later. Both
the mean and variability of UAC apprehensions from Guatemala has remained
consistently high. The plots of the mean and variance changepoints for UAC
apprehensions from Guatemala are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Mean and variance changepoints for Guatemala
The 2008-2009 financial crisis also hit Guatemala hard, with low or even negative
per capita growth rates in the years that followed. Guatemala has historically been one of
the poorest and most unequal countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region
(World Bank Group 2016). While inequality slightly decreased from 2007 to 2014, it
remained significantly above the rest of Central America. Furthermore, poverty actually
increased in the urban areas, even though the rural poverty rate, at 71.4 percent, is nearly
twice urban rate, at thirty-five percent. Education spending rose in real terms at a modest
average of 1.1 percent per year, but per capita education spending actually fell between
2007 and 2013. Guatemala’s public education spending as a percent of GDP is lower
than all the other Central American countries, at only three percent in 2013.
Furthermore, the vast allocation of these funds go to pre-primary and primary education.
Total secondary education spending as a percent of GDP has remained stagnant at 0.3 to
0.4 percent from 2007 to 2013, while enrollment increased from 864,000 to 1,164,000.
However, school attendance rates are lower and drop-out rates occur earlier than in other
Central American countries (World Bank Group 2016). Between 2010 and 2013, the
share of youth not in education, employment or training as a percent of the total youth
population (ages 15 to 24) was a considerable 24.64 percent (World Bank Group 2020a).
Young people, aged 25 or younger, accounted for only thirty-five percent of the
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employed population (World Bank Group 2016). Based on the latest available estimates
of the size of the NEET population in Guatemala, the share of youth not in education,
employment or training rose to over twenty-seven percent as a percent of the youth
population by 2017 (World Bank Group 2020a). Youth out of work and out of school
face greater incentives to migrate for better opportunities abroad (Seelke 2016), and for
Guatemalan children, this is a stronger pull factor than family reunification (Lorenzen
2017).
Change point detection, Honduras
In conducting CPD for monthly UAC migration from Honduras over the period
October 2006 to April 2018, change points in mean apprehensions were found in
February 2013 and again in July 2014. In terms of the variability, change points were
found in October 2013 and June 2014. An abrupt increase in UAC migration occurred
for all three Northern Triangle countries in March 2013, but any subsequent decreases are
inconsistent across the countries. Honduras, in particular had a shorter period of extreme
volatility than other two countries. While the mean apprehensions in UAC from
Honduras experiences a sharp increase in March 2013, mean apprehensions overall
remains the lowest of the three countries. Honduran UAC apprehensions reached a peak
of 3,698 children in one month, with El Salvador peaking at 3,469 and Guatemala at
2,845. In other words, Honduras experienced a shorter episode of extreme UAC
apprehension volatility but had a higher peak number of apprehensions despite lower
overall mean apprehensions. While the mean number of apprehensions fell sharply after
July 2014, some volatility remained. The plots of the mean and variance changepoints
for UAC apprehensions from Honduras are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Mean and variance changepoints for Honduras
In the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Honduras was
experiencing a constitutional crisis with the military detainment, and subsequent exile, of
President Manuel Zelaya (Meyer 2010). The economy had been experiencing strong
growth and stability under President Zelaya, until a significant slowdown began in 2008
with the onset of the global financial crisis (Cordero 2009). While the Honduran
economy grew, on average, by a modest 3.5 percent between 2010 and 2013, its economy
in 2013 was still thirty-three percent lower than Guatemala’s and half the size of El
Salvador’s. In 2013, however, the growth rate in per capita GDP slowed to less than one
percent. However, poverty rates had long been a problem even prior to the global
financial crisis and continued to be a concern thereafter. Extreme poverty is higher in
rural areas, at 55.6 percent versus 29 percent in urban areas in 2013. Income poverty is
the highest in the region, which reflects back to its high inequality rates. Honduras has
significantly boosted primary enrollment and completion rates, with secondary
enrollment rates consistent with the Central American average. The urban rural divide is
as significant in Honduras as it is in Guatemala, however. Secondary school enrollment
rates in rural areas are half that of the urban areas. Overall enrollment rates drop to 43.9
percent by the start of secondary school. Spending on education is one of the largest
categories of public spending, thirty-seven percent in 2013, which is high even compared
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to OECD standards. Nonetheless, between 2007 and 2013 it decreased on average five
percent in real terms per year. Between 2007 and 2013 youth unemployment, even for
those completing secondary education, rose from 6.4 percent to 13 percent, representing
lower returns to education and greater incentives to migrate (World Bank Group 2015a).
Honduran children faced the shortest increase in mean UAC, and this can be tied back to
lack of established immigrant communities in the United States for family reunification
and support.
Change point detection, Mexico
Mexican UAC apprehensions trends differ in many ways from those found for the
Northern Triangle countries. As mentioned previously, prior to 2014 the majority of
UAC apprehensions were Mexican children. In conducting CPD for monthly UAC
migration from Mexico over the period October 2006 to April 2018, change points in
mean apprehensions were found in December 2008 and May 2014. Mean UAC
apprehensions spiked in January of 2009, much earlier than the spikes in mean UAC
apprehensions from the Northern Triangle countries. More pointedly, while overall
monthly mean UAC apprehensions from Mexico are the highest of all four countries in
this study, the spike occurred earlier and the mean number of apprehensions significantly
decreased by June 2014. Furthermore, a significant reduction in variability was also the
case between June 2014 and September 2016. After September 2016, variability
increased but it was coupled with lower mean values. The plots of the mean and variance
changepoints for UAC apprehensions from Mexico are shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Mean and variance changepoints for Mexico
Informality rates in Mexican employment, which measure lack of access to social
benefits, increased nearly two percentage points between the fourth quarters of 2008 and
2009. Employment of young adults, aged less than 26 years, fell by more than 540,000
jobs. The greatest job losses were for those with just primary level schooling (Freije et
al. 2011). The weakening economy brought greater school drop-out rates due to
worsening career expectations. Furthermore, youth out of work and out of school raise
serious security concerns as the draw of criminal organizations becomes more attractive
(Villareal 2010).
The Mexican UAC migration spike of 2009 occurred at the height of the U.S.
financial crisis when most indicators reflected a lower United States demand for
immigrant labor and falling Mexican emigration (Freije et al. 2011, Alba 2013). While
this may seem counterintuitive at first glance, the distinction between circular and settled
Mexican migration has become more blurred over time. Many migrants travel back and
forth between the two countries (Alba 2013), making it more difficult to properly account
for the motivations behind the actual flows. Furthermore, circular migrants tend to be
younger and predominantly male, which coincides with the demographic makeup of child
migrants (UNHCR 2014, Kandel 2019). The fact that the Mexican community in the
United States is the largest Hispanic community, accounting for twenty-nine percent of
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all immigrants (Radford et al. 2019), also supports the notion of circular migration
allowing for extensive migrant networks in both directions.
Furthermore, the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA) made special provisions for children from non-contiguous countries while
allowing for the immediate deportation of Mexican children under certain conditions.
According to a 2015 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, the CBP repatriated
about ninety-three percent of Mexican UAC under the age of 14 between fiscal years
2009 through 2014. The different treatment of Mexican UAC compared to that of noncontiguous countries may have contributed to the decline in Mexican UACs just as the
number of Northern Triangle UACs began to rise. In addition, all three Northern
Triangle countries saw decreases in the growth of their social well-being indicators
leading up to the changepoint in mean UAC apprehensions of February 2013. El
Salvador actually saw declines in the HDI in 2011 and Honduras in 2012. Until 2014,
growth in the HDI did not exceed one percent in any Northern Triangle country in any
year following the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
The role that human trafficking and smuggling operations play in illegal
migration may also be a contributing factor in the UAC surge from the Northern Triangle
countries. It is estimated that 75 to 80 percent of unaccompanied child migrants travel
with smugglers (Snider 2014). As these criminal organizations became more profitable,
they also engaged in more targeted marketing strategies. Smugglers routinely exploit
minors into believing that their extended stay is a special permit, or “permiso”, to remain
in the United States (Chishti et al. 2015). According to a report issued by the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), the CBP interviewed 230 migrants that were apprehended in
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the Rio Grande Valley in May 2014. Of the 230 interviewed, 219 cited that the primary
reasons for migrating was the perception that the United States was granting permisos to
UAC and adult females traveling with minors (Darby 2014, Stewart 2014, Chishti et al.
2015). In July 2014, the CBP announced the “Dangers Awareness Campaign” which
discredited much of the false information smugglers were spreading about U.S.
immigration policy. As part of this effort, Mexico began the “Programa Frontera Sur” to
increase security on its own southern border with Guatemala. In fact, Mexico deported
21,547 children back to Central America in the first eleven months of 2014, up from
7,738 in 2013 (Chishti et al. 2015). Furthermore, these stricter measures coincide with a
change point in increased volatility in UAC apprehensions at the United States southern
border for all Northern Triangle countries.
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CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION
The literature to date on unaccompanied child migration from the Northern
Triangle countries and Mexico has provided pieces of the puzzle for understanding the
push and pull factors behind the migration trends. Interviews and surveys conducted with
migrant children have offered only a glimpse into the circumstances they face, both in
their home countries and in connection to family members already living in the United
States. While their responses are valuable from a micro-level perspective, they do not
permit a macro-level analysis of the economic, social, and security conditions of each
country, or of the extent of their interconnectedness to U.S. society. Of the published
research relying on macro-level quantitative data, the studies are limited to the years prior
to the 2014 surge in UAC migration from the Northern Triangle countries. Furthermore,
UAC migration from this region is typically treated as homogenous, rather than analyzed
separately as migration from three different countries with very different conditions. No
study to date has attempted to quantify the effects of the growing interconnectedness
between countries in facilitating the migratory journey of unaccompanied children.
While many unaccompanied children cite family reunification or economic opportunities
abroad as a pull factor behind their migration, without the migratory networks established
by previous migrants, the journey would be too uncertain. Dating back to Lee’s (1966)
seminal work, the push and pull factors of migration work alongside intervening
obstacles, such as distance, physical borders, and threat of harm, in influencing a person’s
decision to migrate. Furthermore, the attractiveness of a destination is shaped by the
knowledge a person has obtained about that destination. Technology plays a significant
role in decreasing both intervening obstacles and the uncertainty of life abroad. Increased
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social globalization, through increased telecommunications, as well as the financial
linkages that are made possible by it, have increased the awareness of opportunities
abroad. In addition, cultural hybridization through previous waves of migration, and a
growing trade in cultural goods, has broadened national identities beyond strictly
geographic borders. Since 1970, the Mexican and Central American diaspora in the
United States rose by a factor of twenty at a time when the United States immigrant
population grew four-fold. Social globalization permitted a strengthening of ties between
the diaspora living in the United States and those left behind (Brick et al. 2011).
A fixed effects regression is conducted on the push and pull factors most affecting
child migration, as evidenced by the literature. Particular attention is given to the
economic and social conditions of youth, considering the additional risks faced by those
who are neither at work, in school, or training. The desire for family reunification is
quantified through the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index, which measures the
growing interconnectedness of people across borders, both culturally and financially.
While there is no global data on migration flows tied to family reunification per se, the
strength of the connections of personal relationships, as measured through social
globalization, serves as a useful estimate of this interrelation. The results of the model
reveal that the unemployment rate of youth, expected years of schooling, and social
globalization prove to be important factors in motivating UAC migration. Social
globalization in particular proved to be the most statistically significant factor in
explaining unaccompanied child migration. A one-unit increase in the KOF Social
Globalization de facto Index results in over a fifty percent jump in UAC migration. More
pointedly, it is not only the well-being of youth, in terms of employment and educational
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opportunities in the home country that matter for UAC migration, but also the strength of
the ties to family members and opportunities of living abroad. The push factors present
in each country work together with increased social globalization to entice greater child
migration numbers from the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
Although the fixed effects model allows for heterogeneity across countries, each
country does exhibit differences in terms of the push and pull factors affecting their
respective populations. While UAC migration from the Northern Triangle countries
tends to be evaluated as one single phenomenon, this approach is not always appropriate.
To further analyze the differences across countries, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis
and Mann-Whitney U tests are conducted. The push conditions are aggregated by using
the Human Development Index, while the pull conditions are captured by the KOF Social
Globalization de facto Index. The results of tests reveal that the populations from the
three Northern Triangle countries and Mexico are not statistically similar, with the
exception of Guatemala and Honduras. These two countries, however, are still
statistically different for the most part, except for one component of the HDI and one
component of the KOF Social Globalization de facto Index. More pointedly, they only
differ statistically from each other in terms of the educational attainment of their
populations and in terms of their exposure to informational globalization. Otherwise, the
populations of all four countries cannot be considered to be identical and should not be
treated as such. This is an important finding since it indicates that it is best to analyze the
push and pull factors behind child migration on a country-by-country basis.
Change point detection facilitated further analysis on an individual country basis
for the mean and variance of monthly UAC apprehensions. While all three Northern
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Triangle countries saw sharp rises in mean UAC apprehensions around the same time, the
trend varied by country. The mean and variance of UAC apprehensions for Guatemala
remained consistently high through 2018. El Salvador followed a similar pattern but did
see declines in mean UAC by early 2017. Honduras, however, saw a short period of
heightened mean UAC apprehensions and variability, with declines in both by the
summer of 2014. Mexican UAC apprehensions, on the other hand, occurred much
earlier, with significant decreases in both the mean and variance as apprehensions from
the Northern Triangle surged.
Future research
The research conducted in this study can be expanded in several directions. First
and foremost, each country should be evaluated separately as to the push and pull
conditions faced by young adults. For Mexican and Salvadoran youth for example,
previous waves of migration have established strong networks that encourage greater
family reunification. Remittance spending can provide further evidence as to whether
these transfers improve the conditions of those left behind, or whether they serve to fund
greater migratory flows. As the world becomes more interconnected, cultural differences
become less definitive. This is particularly evident in young adults as new, blended
cultures are adopted through increased interactions with social media and the trade in
cultural goods. Furthermore, differences in standards of living across countries become
more apparent. Advances in telecommunications increase the awareness of a better life
abroad, a life that no longer seems so foreign given cultural hybridization. In analyzing
Honduran and Guatemalan youth, for example, the search for economic opportunities in
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the United States was a strong motive behind their migration. This was not necessarily
tied to family reunification.
Greater research is needed into the impact of various programs aimed at
improving the conditions of young adults in the developing world. In order to achieve
this, a better measure of job-ready skills is critical, as the usual measures of years of
schooling, enrollment rates, and test scores leave much unaccounted for. Research on the
growing NEET phenomenon is gaining momentum and data is becoming more available
as to the extent of this epidemic in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico. Several
multi-organizational partnerships between governments and non-governmental
organizations are aimed at addressing this epidemic, with results-based vocational
training programs and apprenticeships. Evaluating the effectiveness of these programs,
and tying them to the labor force participation rates of young adults, is critical for their
success and further dissemination into society. Exploring the relationship between
human capital investment and young adult migration would then become more
productive.
Finally, since social globalization proved to be highly significant in explaining
unaccompanied child migration, the link between globalization and child migration
should be broken down further into the particular aspects of globalization that are most
influential. Again, it could be as simple as increased remittance spending or greater
access to telecommunications, but it could also be more complex in terms of the
hybridization of cultural identities through a growing trade in cultural goods. The
difficulty here will lie in isolating the most significant variables, while avoiding the
strong relationships that these variables seem to share. While social globalization can be
96

difficult to quantify, this research has shown that it also has the potential to provide the
greatest insights into contemporary migration trends.
In closing, in an era of heightened globalization, countries do not simply become
more interconnected economically, but also politically and socially as well. Cultural
distinctions become blurred as migrant families adopt a more blended identity.
Communication pathways are reinforced through greater access to telecommunications
and the internet. As long-distance relationships become more solidified, a culture of
migration is passed from one generation to the next. Just as rural-urban migration trends
are fueled by the possibility of a better life in the cities, so is international migration.
Previous migrants not only show those left behind that there is a possibility of a better
life, but they also provide the information and finances necessary to make the journey. In
an era of globalization, low-to-medium development countries, such as those in the
Northern Triangle region, will continue to face out-migration so long as they do not
invest more in their youth. Young adults seeking a better life are turning their attention
beyond their own borders, with the support of those that went before them.
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APPENDIX A– Additional Tables
Table A1.
Dataset variables and their respective sources
Variable
UAC apprehensions
Unemployment rate of youth (ages 15-24)
Expected years of schooling
Homicide rate (per 100,000 population)
KOF Social Globalization de facto Index
Interpersonal Globalization de facto Index
Informational Globalization de facto Index
Cultural Globalization de facto Index
Human Development Index
Income Index
Education Index
Life Expectancy Index

Source
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, public release & FOIA data request
World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Human Development Reports, UNDP
Instituto Igarape, public release & data request
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, public release & data request
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, public release & data request
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, public release & data request
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, public release & data request
Human Development Reports, UNDP
Human Development Reports, UNDP
Human Development Reports, UNDP
Human Development Reports, UNDP

Table A2.
KOF Social Globalization de facto index, breakdown of components
A. Interpersonal Globalization
International voice traffic Incoming and outgoing fixed and mobile telephone traffic in minutes per capita
Inflows & outflows of goods, services, income, financial items without a quid pro quo per capita
Transfers
Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a share of population
International tourism
Inbound and outbound number of tertiary students (% population)
International students
Number of foreign or foreign‐born residents as percentage of total population
Migration
B. Informational Globalization
Used capacity of international internet bandwidth in bps per capita (% population)
Used internet bandwidth
Patent applications by non-residents (% of population)
International patents
Exports of high R&D intensity products in current US$
High technology exports
C. Cultural Globalization
Sum of exports and imports of cultural goods
Trade in cultural goods
Trade in personal services Trademark registration applications by non-residents (% of applications)
Sum of exports & imports in personal, cultural, and recreational services (% population)
International trademarks
Number of McDonald's restaurants (% population)
McDonald's restaurant
Number of IKEA stores (% population)
Ikea stores

Table A3.
Fixed effects model results with clustered standard errors
Dependent variable: UAC apprehensions (log)
Explanatory variables (lag)

Coefficient

Youth unemployment rate
Expected years schooling
Homicide rate
Social globalization index

0.1125
-0.5883
0.0036
0.5324
corr(u_i, Xb)
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

R2
within 0.7127
between 0.2592
overall 0.4837

100

Robust
SE
0.0275
0.0943
0.0068
0.0582
-0.5884
0.7954
0.5518
0.6751

pvalue
0.0260
0.0080
0.6310
0.0030
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